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Introduction
Ron and Sarah are on their way to a meeting of anti-war
activists. Somehow, they get onto the topic of lying.
Ron: “Look, I avoid lying as a matter of principle.
It’s a Gandhian thing. I was very influenced by Rob
Burrowes who wrote about this.”1
Sarah: “Oh yeah? What about this? You’re listening
to an amateur musical group, and your friend Helen is in
the group. You think it sounds terrible, but then Helen
comes up to you afterwards and asks ‘Did you like it?’
Are you going to tell her what you really think?”
Ron: “I’d try to be honest, but in a polite way. Maybe
something like ‘It was good to see you enjoying yourself,
Helen’.”
Sarah: “Isn’t that a cop-out? You didn’t really say
what you were thinking. Isn’t it deception?”
Ron: “Well, I wouldn’t tell a lie. I didn’t say anything
actually false.”
Sarah: “Let’s try this scenario. You’re living in occupied France during World War II. The Nazis come to your
door and ask whether there are any Jews in the house.”
Ron: “Really? The Nazi argument?”

1 Robert J. Burrowes, The Strategy of Nonviolence Defense: A
Gandhian Perspective (Albany, NY: State University of New
York Press, 1996), p. 183. See chapter 5 for a discussion.
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Sarah: “Just answer. Would you lie to the Nazis to
save a Jew?”
Ron: “How about this? I respond, ‘You’ll need to go
elsewhere if you want to find Jews’.”
Sarah: “But you’re deceiving the Nazis. You’re not
telling the full truth.”
Ron: “It’s only hypothetical. In real-life situations, I
always try to be honest.”
Ron and Sarah arrive at the meeting. It’s a group of
eight experienced campaigners, and they are planning a
protest at an arms factory. The idea is to inform the police
about impending civil disobedience, but only after getting
into position.
Sarah, being provocative: “Don’t you think we
should tell the police everything in advance?”
Sam: “But then we’d never get into position for the
action. They’d stop us.”
Chris: “That’s right. We should only tell them what
they need to know. Especially that we won’t be doing
anything violent.”
Ron (taking the bait): “Yes, Sarah, I know I said I
avoid lying as a matter of principle. But we won’t be
lying.”
Sarah: “So why not invite the police along to our
meeting?”
Sam: “Enough, enough! Let’s get this sorted out and
then we can have the philosophical discussion about
Gandhi and honesty.”
Who — Sarah, Ron or Sam — is being sensible and who
is being principled? The group could have continued
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discussing lying. If so, would their conclusion depend on
basic principles, or would it depend on the circumstances,
for example what the police might do?
Truth and lying are important issues in activism, as
they are in everyday life. Most people think telling the
truth is important, and can get angry at obvious political
lying. Yet most parents train their children to lie. Sue is
having a party for her fifth birthday and aunt Ellen is
coming to visit. Sue’s parents warn her to say thank you
and tell how much she likes aunt Ellen’s gift, even if it is
really ugly and unwelcome.
Activism and lying
Ron and Sarah are activists: they want to change the world
for the better and they, like nearly everyone who tries to
change the world, believe they are ethical. Ron and Sarah
are a special sort of ethical activist: they want to use
methods that reflect their goals. They want a more peaceful world so, unlike militaries and terrorists, they use
peaceful methods.
A complication arises when it comes to deception.
Ron and Sarah, without even thinking carefully about it,
prefer a world that is more open and honest. After all, too
much harm is caused by powerful groups using secrecy
and lies to serve their interests. Ron in particular has taken
to heart the idea that lying is wrong, but Sarah, with her
questions, points to some complications. Sarah’s scenarios
suggest that being open and honest might not always be a
good idea, even for a highly ethical activist.
My aim in this book is to highlight the tensions
around activism, openness and honesty. This involves
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presenting some background information about deception
and lying. Chapter 2 covers basic concepts and findings,
including types of lies and how common they are. Chapter
3 takes up the big topic of lies by authorities, such as
government leaders. Chapter 4 is about methods of detecting deception. Chapter 5 is about ethical dimensions
concerning lying and telling the truth. Chapter 6 presents a
range of scenarios in which activists need to confront
issues of secrecy and honesty, and offers some criteria for
assessing the use of deception. Chapter 7 summarises
some key points. At the end there’s an annotated bibliography of books I think are especially worthwhile. These
provide documentation and you will find in them additional references that support the general statements I
make about deception.
It would be nice to be able to point to some easy
answers, but unfortunately there aren’t any. Furthermore,
even just getting into the topic can be uncomfortable,
because popular ideas about lying, especially about how
bad it is, clash with evidence about the positive functions
of lying. This clash is especially acute for activists who
see themselves as behaving ethically, yet assume deception is unethical. Rather than sweeping the tensions under
the carpet, it may be better to start talking about deception
and about when it can serve worthwhile purposes.

2
Lying and deception
in human affairs
Key points
• Lying includes telling falsehoods and withholding truths.
• Lies can be beneficial or harmful or somewhere in
between.
• Most people lie more frequently than they realise.
• Secrecy and lying are often connected.
• Self-deception is common, and is linked to deceiving
others.
• Social systems are built on “basic lies” about the way the
world works.
Most people think lying is saying something they know is
false. Instead of telling the truth, they say something else.
For example, a government spokesperson says, “We have
conclusive evidence that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction,” even though the evidence is sketchy. But what
about the more cautious statement, “There is evidence that
Iraq has weapons of mass destruction”? This claim is
safer: there might well be some evidence of WMDs, even
though this evidence is weak and questionable. Is it a lie?
A lot of people think that withholding the truth — not
saying something you know is true — doesn’t count as a
lie. According to this view, saying “There is evidence that
Iraq has weapons of mass destruction” isn’t a lie.
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However, it is definitely deceptive: relevant information is
omitted, for example that the evidence is testimony from
an unreliable informant.
Because of this common approach to the idea of
lying, government officials often go through contortions to
say things that aren’t technically false, but leave out vital
information necessary to understand the truth. To talk
about lying of this nature, there are two main options. The
first is to set aside the word “lie” and instead refer to
deception. The other option is to define “lie” differently,
so as to include withholding the truth.
The second option is adopted by Paul Ekman, one of
the most prominent writers about lying. He defines a lie as
“a deliberate choice to mislead a target without giving any
notification of the intent to do so.”1 Note his use of the
word “mislead.” This can be done by telling a falsehood
or by withholding the truth. Using Ekman’s definition, the
government spokesperson is lying about WMDs — or at
least someone involved in preparing the statement is lying.
“Lying is done with words, and also with silence.” ―
Adrienne Rich, Women and Honor: Some Notes on
Lying

For most people, these options are familiar in everyday life. Someone invites you to a party and you decline,
saying “Sorry, I have a prior engagement.” Actually, you
dislike the host or just think you’ll be bored, but don’t
1 Paul Ekman, Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace,
Politics, and Marriage (New York: Norton, 1985/2009), p. 41.
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want to wreck your relationship by being brutally honest.
The phrase “brutally honest” is revealing: honesty can be
damaging to others or to relationships.
Your partner asks, “How do I look in this outfit?” If
you’re sensitive, your answer will be attuned to your
partner’s expectations. If the two of you are used to being
“brutally honest” then maybe you can say what you think,
but otherwise you might say, “You look great” even
though you really think something else. After all, the
question “How do I look in this outfit?” often isn’t really a
sincere request for information: it’s meant to solicit a
compliment. If someone is really inviting a compliment by
using a standard code, then why not give one?
People speak in code all the time, saying things they
don’t mean literally. In greeting you, a co-worker might
say “How are you today?” In Australia, this is a convention, meaning “Hello.” So you answer “Fine” rather than
“I didn’t sleep well last night and now I’m tired and have
a headache.”2
The politeness code is straightforward in everyday
interactions, and can also be applied in special circumstances, with positive or negative consequences. You visit
your dying friend Chris, who asks “Was it all worthwhile?” or “Have you always loved me?” You might feel
compassionate or polite and answer, “Yes, of course.”
Actually, you know Chris did some bad things and made a
mess of a promising life, and you don’t love Chris at all.
2 Different cultures have different codes, so in some places this
example will not make any sense.
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What if your friend, who is seriously ill but doesn’t
want to recognise it, says “We’ll go to the big concert
together next week.” You could be blunt and say, “You’re
seriously ill, and really need to have an operation.” If
you’re too polite, you may do a disservice to your friend.
In response to the “How do I look?” question, an honest
answer, phrased cautiously as “You might look even better
in the other outfit,” could prevent a fashion disaster.
Codes can become complicated, and not everyone
can decipher them. Some people are more literal than
others and don’t easily pick up on the underlying message.
People on the autism spectrum can have special difficulty
picking up hidden meanings. This means that speaking in
codes in which the literal meaning is false or misleading
can provide accurate messages to some but be deceptive
for others.
The way people present themselves to others is often
misleading. An example is pretending to be confident
when you’re not. Cosmetic surgery, make-up and holding
in your stomach can give a false impression of your age
and physical condition. Expensive clothes might suggest
you are richer than you actually are.
Social media offer many opportunities for creating an
image. By posting attractive photos of yourself, of your
travels and your friends, and seldom posting anything
suggesting boredom or difficulties, you present a shining
picture to the world. Some who know you well may
realise they’re not receiving a full picture of your life, but
nonetheless seeing only the best sides of your friends’
lives can be demoralising due to the process of social
comparison. It also can encourage a sort of competition in
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positive self-presentation, which means mutual deception
becomes the norm.
Setting aside codes, conventions and presenting a
personal image, most people are regularly deceptive in
more obvious ways, and not just about telling little kids
that Santa Claus is coming. After a man beats his wife and
the neighbours call the police, he tells them they were just
having a loud argument. His wife, afraid of him, also lies
to the police. Both of them lie to their neighbours, either
by telling falsehoods or withholding the truth.
Serious deceptions often lead to a whole string of
lies. A man has a gambling habit but is too ashamed to tell
his partner or his friends. He hides his addiction through a
series of lies about where he spends his time, who he
meets, where the money goes, and a host of other things.
As well as gambling, there are many possible scenarios for
a life filled with lies: alcoholism, sexual affairs, theft,
sexual harassment, paedophilia, and various diseases.
Any activity linked to shame can lead to deception. If
you suffer panic attacks or have compulsive behaviours,
you may feel ashamed to admit it. You might say you’d
rather not take a flight and not admit to a fear of flying. In
a classroom, the teacher asks, “Does everyone understand?” The children remain silent because none of them
wants to reveal their ignorance. The same thing happens to
adults. The boss asks for feedback about any possible
problems with a new policy, and no one in the room is
willing to point out an obvious flaw because they are
afraid of the boss’s reaction. They are all being deceptive
about what they think. According to Ekman’s definition,
they are all lying.
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Researchers say that most people are seriously deceptive — telling falsehoods and withholding the truth — on
a regular basis, typically several times daily, depending on
how this is measured. If uses of conventional codes such
as saying “Fine” when you’re feeling not so well are
included, this adds greatly to the total. Most people think
of themselves as honest, but the reality is quite different.
Anyone who has ever hoped their parents would die
or wished calamity on their co-workers is unwise to
express these thoughts. Someone who always tells the
truth and withholds nothing is likely to end up losing all
their friends.
Is it a lie?
Going back to Ekman’s definition of a lie — “a deliberate
choice to mislead a target without giving any notification
of the intent to do so” — it is useful to note that some
forms of deception are not lies. A novelist creates a fictional story that, in many instances, is intended to capture
truths about the human condition, but is not intended to be
the literal truth. By being categorised as fiction, the
novelist has, in Ekman’s terms, given notification of the
intent to mislead the reader. The same applies to films. Of
course there are some grey areas. Documentary films are
intended to be truthful, but there are creative adaptations
of true stories that mix truth and fiction. A filmmaker
might add the disclaimer “based on a true story,” which
signals that some facts have been changed for dramatic
purposes. A different disclaimer, “inspired by a true
story,” suggests a looser connection with the facts.
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“Writing fiction is the act of weaving a series of lies to
arrive at a greater truth.” ― Khaled Hosseini

Professional wrestling is a type of performance art,
not intended to be a true competitive sport. Is it a lie?
Some audience members believe the contest is real rather
than staged, so for them a professional wrestling event is a
lie, but for others, who know how it operates, there is no
deception.
There’s another complication implicit in the definition: a lie is “a deliberate choice” by the liar. Sometimes
people are deluded. If Fred believes he is a famous author,
then when he tells others about his accomplishments he is
not lying, because he believes what he says. In many
cases, people start off lying and then, having repeated the
lie many times, start to believe it. There is lots of evidence
that people can come to believe things that never happened.3 In cases of “recovered memory,” an adult may
remember being sexually abused as a child. In some cases,
these memories reflect actual abuse, but in others false
memories are encouraged by therapists, rehearsed repeatedly and eventually felt to be just as real as actual
memories. In such a case, a false recovered memory is not
a lie, because the adult fully believes it is true.
An important point here — obvious but worth stating
— is that just because someone believes something does
3 A highly cited study is Henry L. Roediger III and Kathleen B.
McDermott, “Creating false memories: remembering words not
presented in lists,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1995, pp. 803–814.
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not make it true. You may be honest, but that’s not a
guarantee that everything you say is true.
Types of lies
Lies can be classified in various ways. A simple distinction is between benign and malign lies. Benign lies are
intended to be beneficial to the target, for example when
you tell a friend they’re doing well on a task to give them
encouragement to keep trying. Malign lies are harmful to
the target, such as when you blame someone else for your
own mistake or crime.
“A truth that’s told with bad intent
Beats all the lies you can invent.”
― William Blake, Auguries of Innocence

The distinction between benign and malign lies,
basically between good and bad lies, is convenient as an
initial classification, but it doesn’t capture many of the
complexities of deception. A more elaborate system uses
colours to signify the significance of the lie.4
White lies are ones that seem harmless, and may help
smooth social relationships. These lies seldom hurt anyone, and provide no special benefit or protection for the
liar. Examples are falsely saying “Very much” when asked
“Did you enjoy the party?” and saying “Yum” when
eating your friend’s somewhat unappetising meal.
4 I draw here on the framework presented by Mahzarin R. Banaji
and Anthony G. Greenwald, Blindspot: Hidden Biases of Good
People (New York: Delacorte Press, 2013), pp. 21ff.
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Gray lies are more ambiguous in terms of protecting
a person by hiding the truth. You’ve been dreaming about
a former relationship and then, when asked by your
current partner, “What were you moaning about?” say
“Was I moaning? I don’t remember.” Denial can be more
pointed, when someone astutely labels your behaviour.
For example, you’ve been complaining at length to a
friend about your neighbour’s large new house extension.
Your friend says, in a pleasant manner, “You’re really just
envious, aren’t you?” You say, “No, not at all,” thus
denying what you suddenly realise is an unwelcome truth.
Colourless lies involve self-deception (a topic covered in more detail later). Someone who drinks an
enormous amount of alcohol may say to the doctor or a
friend, “I drink a lot, but I’m not an alcoholic.”
Red lies are one that, millennia ago, would have
provided an advantage in survival. This might be stealing
someone’s food and then blaming the theft on an innocent
person, or lying to a romantic partner that “We’ll be
married after I get a divorce.” Your business is going
bankrupt but you lie to everyone that it’s going fine. You
spend lavishly on clothes, cars and dinners to impress
friends and clients, suggesting that you have a lot more
money than you do — actually you can’t really afford
your luxuries. (Note that lying can occur via deeds as well
as words.) Red lies are involved in many types of corruption, as well as threats that will never be carried out:
“You’ll regret this” or “I’ll kill you.”
Blue lies are falsehoods intended to convey a deeper
truth. You say “I’ve always loved you” when you believe
love is the essence of the relationship even though there

14

The deceptive activist

were plenty of times without love, or filled with active
hate.
Secrecy and lies
Your friend Chris asks you to keep a secret. Chris is planning to leave Sam after many years together, but doesn’t
want Sam to know about it just yet. You say to Chris, “I
won’t tell anyone.” Depending on who you interact with,
you’re probably going to have to lie or break your
promise. If you see Sam on a daily basis, then you have to
withhold the truth. That may be awkward, especially if
Sam says, “Things haven’t been going well with Chris
recently. I’m not sure what to do.” This is a plea for
sympathy or help, and the challenge of keeping Chris’
secret becomes greater. If your loyalty to Chris is greater,
you might decide to keep the secret, but you might decide
that your concern for Sam’s welfare overrides your
promise.
Some people just can’t keep a secret. If you want
everyone to know some piece of gossip, just tell Al, who
will tell everyone else, often with embellishments.
However, as Al’s reputation for gossiping becomes
known, acquaintances will never tell Al anything they
really want to remain secret.
When you promise to keep a secret and actually do,
this is commonly seen as virtuous. It means you can be
trusted to keep your word. But, ironically, it also means
you have to be a convincing liar, not revealing the truth
even under interrogation.
Many jobs have secrecy mandated in specific domains. A lawyer is professionally required to maintain
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confidentiality regarding meetings with clients, and
similar expectations affect teachers, doctors, journalists,
clergy and various others. Many government employees
have to sign contracts banning them from revealing
information gained in the course of their work. In national
security, employees have to obtain a security clearance;
penalties for violating secrecy requirements can be severe.
In all these areas, maintaining secrecy can mean that
deceiving others is necessary, even routine.
When others recognise professional obligations, there
may be no immediate tension. Seldom does a member of
the public approach a doctor and say, “I’d like you to give
me information about patient Smith.” When there are
formal protocols, everything operates smoothly. Nevertheless, professional obligations can lead to moments
when deception is required. The doctor might be attending
a social function and meet someone for whom a particular
piece of patient information would be highly relevant, and
would like to say “You really need to know that Smith
will probably die soon.”
Secrecy can serve valuable social functions as well as
protecting criminals and corrupt systems. It is not automatically good or bad. In any case, secrecy is often tied up
with deception.
Self-deception
Can you lie to yourself? It sounds contradictory, but that’s
because people think their “self” is unitary, namely a
single whole. If the “self” has different parts, then one part
can deceive another.
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An example is an alcoholic who doesn’t want to
admit to the label “alcoholic.” One part of the alcoholic’s
self knows about the problem, and the suitability of the
label, but another part, the conscious part, doesn’t recognise it.
Lying to others is closely linked to self-deception,
indeed lying to others is often necessary to maintain selfdeception.5 A man who beats his wife doesn’t want to
admit to himself that he acts like a brutal bully; his lies to
others about how good a husband he is enable him to
maintain his own illusions.
“We lie the loudest when we lie to ourselves.” ― Eric
Hoffer

Many psychologists adopt the model of humans
having two minds.6 One is intuitive and automatic, the
other rational and reflective. The rational mind is the one
we think of as ourself; it is more commonly the conscious
mind. Yet many decisions are driven by the intuitive mind,
for example the urge to drink alcohol and for a man to lash
out at his wife. Amazingly, the two minds operate inde5 Robert Trivers, The Folly of Fools: The Logic of Deceit and
Self-Deception in Human Life (New York: Basic Books, 2011).
6 See for example Jonathan St B. T. Evans, Thinking Twice: Two
Minds in One Brain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010);
Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar,
Straus and Giroux, 2011); Timothy D. Wilson, Strangers to
Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).
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pendently for the most part: it is difficult or impossible for
the rational mind to directly access the intuitive mind.
This is apparent when people do things — buy an expensive car, eat junk food — that their rational minds know
are unwise.
The divergence between the intuitive and rational
minds can be a source of lying and self-deception.
Suppose you buy a new phone. You chose the phone
because your intuitive mind preferred it, perhaps because
of the colour, sleek style or because all your friends are
getting the same model. But you don’t consciously want to
admit to such motivations, so you say to others that you
needed all the functions provided or the phone had good
consumer ratings or something else that sounds plausible
— anything but what you suspect is the truth. And perhaps
you don’t really know the truth in your conscious mind,
because you don’t want to admit to yourself that you, like
nearly everyone else, are swayed by marketing or social
conformity.
Self-deception is common in politics. When politicians lie often enough, they may start believing their lies,
in which case they aren’t technically lies any longer, but
rather falsehoods that are sincerely believed.
At a meeting of activists, Mary accuses Fred of being
sexist, because of a comment he made. Fred responds,
“I’m sorry if my remark came across as sexist. I didn’t
mean it.” Maybe deep down Fred realises he did mean it,
but he lies to save face at a meeting where anti-sexism is
the standard line. Or maybe Fred deceives himself,
believing he has no sexist thoughts. Mary might also be
deceiving herself. Maybe she criticised Fred to get back at
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him for an earlier slight: she wasn’t really concerned about
his comment, so in a sense her accusation was premised
on a deception — and likely a self-deception — about her
real motivation.
This example illustrates the complexities that can
arise when self-deception is added to deceptions in social
interactions. In most cases, no one is fully aware of what
everyone is thinking, including themselves.
Detecting lies
Many people imagine they are good at detecting when
others are lying. Employers believe that in a job interview
they can tell which applicants are telling the truth about
their accomplishments and aptitudes and which ones are
giving exaggerated or fabricated accounts. Police believe
they can tell when suspects are lying. Parents believe they
can tell when their teenage children are lying.
There’s research on this, and it shows that these
beliefs are usually wrong.7 Most people, indeed nearly all
people, cannot distinguish a lie from the truth just by
watching someone or hearing them speak. Their rates of
success are little better than flipping a coin.
This is despite various manuals giving advice on
detecting lies, for example by noticing that liars give
fewer details in their accounts or have more facial tics or
7 See Ekman, Telling Lies; Gerald R. Miller and James B. Stiff,
Deceptive Communication (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993);
Aldert Vrij, Detecting Lies and Deceit: Pitfalls and Opportunities, 2nd edition (Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons,
2008). See chapter 4 for more on this.
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move their eyes in certain ways.8 Some of this advice has
entered popular culture, but it seems not to have enabled
much improvement in lie detection capabilities. Anyone
who says they can always detect a lie is simply wrong,
though they probably believe they do have this capacity.
Indeed, anyone who says they can detect lies most of the
time is almost certainly wrong.
The flip side of being poor at detecting lies is that
most people can be convincing liars. Paul Ekman carried
out revealing experiments in which student nurses
watched one of two videos. One video showed a gory
medical scene involving burns and an amputation, the
other a placid ocean scene. The students believed that
hiding their feelings was an important skill for their future
careers, and so had a strong incentive to avoid revealing
their emotions. Most of them were successful: observers
of the students could not determine which video they had
watched.9
Rather than trying to detect lies by observing a
person, it is far more reliable to check facts. If someone
says they have a degree from Oxford, then ask to see their
diploma or contact the university for verification. When a
co-worker says he was ill and couldn’t take a shift, you
might know he was recovering from a big night on the
town — you saw him come home early in the morning and
stagger into the house.
8 For example, Jo-Ellan Dimitrius and Mark Mazzarella, Reading
People: How to Understand People and Predict their Behavior—
Anytime, Anyplace (New York: Random House, 1998).
9 Ekman, Telling Lies, pp. 54–56.
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Basic lies
There are some features of society about which there
seems to be a conspiracy to ignore or misrepresent: no one
speaks the truth, even though everyone knows it. Such
features can be called “basic lies.”10 They are related to
ideology, which is a set of concepts for understanding the
world, serving some groups more than others.
Basic lies can be different in different places. An
example is the idea that everyone is equal before the law.
Judges and politicians usually support this idea, which is
central to maintaining trust in the legal system, even
though they know there are serious biases in courts, for
example with the rich being treated differently than the
poor.11
In the media, a basic lie is that journalists can report
the news without bias, just by reporting the facts. Most
journalists need to maintain this illusion in order to
continue their work, otherwise they become propagandists
or advertisers. The way that news stories are constructed
helps maintain the illusion of objectivity.12 Did you ever
see a news story starting out with a personal approach
such as, “I talked to various people and this is what I
discovered”?
10 F. G. Bailey, The Prevalence of Deceit (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1991).
11 Adam Benforado, Unfair: The New Science of Criminal
Injustice (New York: Crown, 2015).
12 Paul H. Weaver, News and the Culture of Lying (New York:
Free Press, 1994).
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In many countries with systems of representative
government, most people say they live in a “democracy,”
which means rule by the people, implying citizens directly
make decisions that affect them. In practice, people vote
for those who will govern them, something far from the
original idea of a democracy in ancient Greece.13 Elected
politicians commonly claim a mandate for some policy or
other, when actually being elected does not necessarily
mean anyone voted for a particular policy (a referendum
would be required for that), and being supported by a
majority of voters does not imply that everyone supported
the politician.
In many countries, most citizens believe that “we”
are the good guys and “they” (some enemy or stigmatised
group) are the bad guys. In the US after 9/11, politicians,
the media and much of the population believed that the US
was an innocent victim of an unprovoked attack: US
government policies were seen as benevolent rather than
interventionist, self-serving, even imperialistic.14
Closer to home is the common belief in some countries about “stranger danger,” namely that children are
under threat from human predators eager to kidnap or
assault them. Research shows that the greatest threat to
children is from their own family members (and from
13 David Van Reybrouck, Against Elections: The Case for
Democracy (London: Bodley Head, 2016).
14 Mark Cronlund Anderson, Holy War: Cowboys, Indians, and
9/11s (Regina, Saskatchewan: University of Regina Press, 2016);
Ziauddin Sardar and Merryl Wyn Davies, Why Do People Hate
America? (Cambridge: Icon, 2002).
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vehicles). Yet this information seems to have little impact
on the way people think about danger.
To call something a basic lie implies that people
actually realise what is going on but choose to proceed
according to the shared illusion. This is like the story of
the emperor’s new clothes, except that when a child (or a
cynic) cries out that the emperor is naked, no one pays
attention. For many basic lies, there are critics and
challengers who set about exposing them, but this seems
to have little impact: most people carry on just the same.
Conclusion
Most people like to think of themselves as honest, and
believe honesty is the best personal policy. Therefore it
can be a shock to examine the evidence that most people
regularly deceive others and themselves. Another common
belief is that lying is almost always bad, yet in interpersonal interactions, lying can be beneficial in maintaining
relationships and even in helping others.
However, some forms of deception are quite harmful.
Lies by authorities often serve the interests of people at
the top of organisations at the expense of workers and the
community.
The result is that the usual idea that honesty is good
and lying is bad needs to be modified, and this makes life
more complicated. Truth-telling has a social value to be
sure, but it needs to be balanced against other values.
Another complication is that because most people
believe lying is always bad, then catching someone in a lie
(a political opponent for example) can be a potent method
of attack. The most common way to respond to such
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attacks is to assert one’s honesty, and sometimes this involves further deception, for example about what one has
said or done. The result is ever more layers of deception.

Reproduced by permission of Polyp, http://polyp.org.uk

3
Deception by authorities
Key points
• Deception by authorities is often more damaging than
deception between individuals.
• Powerful groups, to reduce outrage over their actions,
use the methods of cover-up, devaluation, reinterpretation, official channels and intimidation, as shown in the
cases of Abu Ghraib and the Nazi T4 programme.
• Authorities can deceive through propaganda, infiltration
of activist groups, and secrecy.
When authorities engage in deception, it is often a serious
matter. The category “authorities” includes politicians,
corporate executives, government officials, police commanders, religious leaders, trade union officials, scientific
experts and a host of others in positions of power and
assumed trust. “Authorities” can include both individuals
and the organisations they represent.
Just as with interpersonal lies, deception by authorities is potentially beneficial and potentially harmful.
However, unlike the everyday lies that ease social relationships, lies by authorities are seldom so innocent. If a
journalist asks “How is the war going?” and a politician
answers “Fine,” the fact that the war is actually not going
so well is not just hiding discomfort but affecting public
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understanding and debate about matters that affect many
human lives.
Another reason to be especially concerned with
deception by authorities relates to Lord Acton’s famous
saying that “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power
corrupts absolutely.”1 Authorities in this context refers to
individuals and small groups at the top of hierarchical
systems, precisely the individuals and groups most
susceptible to the corruptions of power. By being at the
apex of a bureaucratic organisation or prestige system,
authorities have more power and a greater ability to
prevent any adverse reactions due to deceptions that serve
their interests.
Activists often have to deal with deception by authorities. For example, many companies lie about the
environmental and health effects of their activities. A
classic case involved the company Grünenthal that manufactured and sold the morning sickness drug thalidomide.
Reports started coming in about peripheral neuritis among
pregnant women who took the drug. Grünenthal dismissed
these reports, made no attempt to publicise statistics about
adverse reactions, and kept the drug on the market. Later,
a few doctors noticed that some children of mothers who
had taken thalidomide had extreme deformities, and
published their observations, eventually leading to the
1 For research that supports Acton, see David Kipnis, The
Powerholders (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976);
Technology and Power (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1990); Ian
Robertson, The Winner Effect: How Power Affects Your Brain
(London: Bloomsbury, 2012).
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drug being withdrawn. Nevertheless, Grünenthal fought
against legal claims for many years.
Grüenthal’s behaviour involved systematic deceptions at various levels. The company:
• denied all causal connections between thalidomide
and peripheral neuritis
• lied to doctors who wrote asking whether the side
effect of peripheral neuritis had been seen before
• tried to conceal the number of cases reported to the
company
• tried to suppress publication of reports about peripheral neuritis by putting pressure on authors and editors
• sought to counter critical reports with favourable
ones by using money, influence and distortion
• ran a smear campaign against a German doctor,
Lenz, who tried to expose a link between thalidomide and
birth defects.2
In this chapter, I give examples of several types of
deception by authorities, including propaganda, infiltration, lying by figures of authority, and certain types of
secrecy. To ground this treatment, first I present a set of
tactics commonly used by powerful groups when they
want to reduce public outrage over some action or policy.3
2 The Insight Team of The Sunday Times (Phillip Knightley,
Harold Evans, Elaine Potter and Marjorie Wallace), Suffer the
Children: The Story of Thalidomide (London: André Deutsch,
1979).
3 Brian Martin, Justice Ignited: The Dynamics of Backfire
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007); “Backfire materials,” http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/backfire.html.

Deception by authorities

27

Managing outrage
Today, torture is seen by many people as reprehensible.
Therefore, governments do not admit to being involved
with it or tolerating it; instead, they lie about it. Let’s
consider more systematically the tactics used by governments trying to reduce public outrage over their own
involvement in torture.
Cover-up The existence of a torture programme, or of
individual cases of torture, is hidden from wider audiences. This is deception via secrecy. If cover-up is effective, outsiders have no idea of what is occurring, so overt
denials are unnecessary.
At Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq after the US invasion in
2003, guards tortured prisoners in various ways, for
example chaining them in stress positions, piling them on
top of each other naked, threatening them with dogs and,
most famously, attaching electrodes to a prisoner and
making him stand on a box. All this was done in secret,
with no intention of telling outsiders. Only the prisoners
and guards knew what was going on.4
Devaluation Typically, the victims of torture are
denigrated and demonised, for example by being labelled
terrorists, criminals, subversives, heretics or enemies.
Devaluation can occur in advance, during or after torture.
It helps reduce outrage, because many people are not as
concerned about what happens to a devalued person as to
a valued one. Torture of a terrorist seems more acceptable
than torture of a pacifist.
4 For references on this analysis, see Truda Gray and Brian
Martin, “Abu Ghraib,” in Martin, Justice Ignited, pp. 129–141.

28

The deceptive activist

Devaluation is a type of misrepresentation. It typically seeks to reduce empathy for victims by using
negative stereotypes that do not capture the essence of a
person. Furthermore, the labels applied often are false.
Political opponents are called terrorists not as a legitimate
description but rather as a pejorative label.
At Abu Ghraib, prisoners were called terrorists,
insurgents, towel heads and other names. More generally,
in the war on terror, opponents are stigmatised as
inhuman, evil and dangerous.
Reinterpretation Rather than presenting torture as a
violation of human rights and dignity — the normal sort of
interpretation — governments use a variety of method to
reinterpret torture, namely to get people to think of it
differently, as less bad. One reinterpretation technique is
lying, for example saying that there is no torture occurring, or perhaps that investigations show there has been no
torture, when actually there were no investigations.
Lying may sound like cover-up, discussed earlier as a
different tactic, and certainly there’s a close connection.
The distinction is that with cover-up, outsiders don’t even
know anything is happening. With lying, false statements
are made. This is the distinction between lying by
omission (cover-up) and overt lying by making false
statements. After the Abu Ghraib torture was revealed,
one lie was that higher officials were not implicated.
A second reinterpretation technique is minimising the
scale or effects of an action. Torture is acknowledged, but
the amount of it is stated to be smaller than reality. Also, it
might be said not to be all that harmful. The technique of
minimising is a type of lying. The US government referred
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to treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib as “abuse,”
avoiding the word “torture,” and the term “abuse” was
adopted by most of the US mass media. In this way, the
seriousness of the actions was minimised.
A third reinterpretation technique is blaming others
rather than the actual perpetrators and responsible officials. Torture might be blamed on rogue operators, corrupt
officials, or an out-of-control unit. As noted above, the US
government blamed the prison guards for the torture,
avoiding placing any responsibility on higher officials.
Critics of the government have argued to the contrary that
torture at Abu Ghraib was in accordance with policy
expectations.
A fourth reinterpretation technique is framing, which
means looking at things from a particular angle or perspective, in particular in a way that makes the actions
seem more acceptable. Torture is often framed as necessary to obtain information, as a defence against enemies
who are plotting to cause harm. In this way, torture is
looked at not hurting others but rather as part of a defence
against their evil intentions. (According to many experts,
torture is not an effective means of extracting valid
information. In any case, it is more commonly used for
punishment and retribution than for obtaining information.)
Official channels are agencies or processes that are
supposed to ensure fairness, honesty and justice. Examples
include grievance procedures, ombudsmen, police,
auditors and courts. When someone suffers an injustice —
they are bullied, cheated, defamed, assaulted or unfairly
dismissed — often they will go to an official body in
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search of protection or restitution. In many cases formal
procedures and watchdog agencies do their job well. But
when the perpetrator is powerful, perhaps especially when
the government is implicated in injustice, official channels
may give only an illusion of justice.
When an injustice has the potential of stirring up
public outrage, and when perpetrators are powerful,
official channels often serve to reduce outrage. Governments may refer matters to an agency, or sometimes even
set up a formal inquiry. After the Abu Ghraib torture story
became prime-time news, the US government turned to
official channels, announcing prosecutions of prison
guards involved.
For powerful perpetrators, the advantage of official
channels is that they are slow, rely on experts such as
lawyers, and deal with technicalities. As processes continue, public outrage declines, reducing the threat to those
in positions of power.
The trials of Abu Ghraib prison guards followed this
standard pattern. The trials proceeded over many months,
moved the issue from the public domain to the procedural
domain of the courts, and conveniently targeted low-level
participants in the torture, not even addressing high-level
politicians and military figures implicated in the system of
imprisonment and interrogation. The trials diverted attention away from those with the greatest responsibility.
By shifting attention away from people responsible
and by giving a misleading appearance of providing
justice, official channels are involved in an elaborate
deception of the public. This deception is not a case of
lying by individuals (though this can occur along the
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way), but rather is built into the system of agencies and
processes that are tasked with providing justice but are not
given the resources or power to tackle high-level abuses.
Official channels might be considered to constitute a
“basic lie.”5
To say that official channels are involved in an
elaborate deception of the public may be a bit unfair,
because part of the problem is that so many people want to
believe in official channels. Consider for example the
legal system. Many people believe that courts dispense
justice. However, those directly involved with lawyers,
judges and courts know that courts are supposed to apply
the law but justice can be elusive. There are systematic
discrepancies in outcomes due to institutionalised bias in
police operations (low-level thieves are more likely to be
arrested and charged than corrupt business executives),
inequalities in money and power (rich individuals can
afford expensive legal support), and alarm raised by
politicians and the media about certain types of crime
(such as terrorism).
Despite these sorts of biases, a large number people
look to the legal system to provide justice. They also look
to auditors, ombudsmen, anti-corruption bodies, human
rights commissions, environmental agencies, politicians
and a host of others to be fair and efficient in fixing
individual and social problems. Belief in formal channels
develops from a young age: children often take things at
face value, so if a parent or teacher makes a promise, this
5 See chapter 2 and F. G. Bailey, The Prevalence of Deceit
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).
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is taken as a truth. Likewise, when politicians make
promises, many people give them the benefit of the doubt.
As an adult, experience with electoral politics and learning
about political lying can lead to cynicism. However, most
people have little direct contact with courts, anti-corruption agencies and the like, and so may assume they do
what they are supposed to do.
In many cases, governments pass laws or set up
agencies to give the appearance of a solution to a problem.
Pollution? Set up an environmental watchdog and thereby
placate the public. Racial harassment? Pass a law against
it. In many cases, the agencies are inadequately funded
and the laws are not effectively enforced, and in any case
a better approach might be to empower the public rather
than rely on a government agency or law.
Belief in official channels can be aided by a more
general belief that the world is just.6 Some people believe
implicitly that nearly everything that happens is fair, so
they blame women when they are sexually harassed and
blame the unemployed for losing their jobs and not finding
new ones. A strong belief in a just world often means
blaming the victim. It also can lead to undue confidence in
official channels.

6 See for example Melvin J. Lerner, The Belief in a Just World: A
Fundamental Delusion (New York: Plenum, 1980); Leo Montada
and Melvin J. Lerner, eds., Responses to Victimizations and Belief
in a Just World (New York: Plenum, 1998); Michael Ross and
Dale T. Miller, eds., The Justice Motive in Everyday Life
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
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Official channels thus are part of a grand deception,
not so much through design but through a combination of
people’s mistaken expectations and beliefs interacting
with governments and other powerful groups setting up
and pointing to agencies and laws as if they are capable of
solving individual and social problems.
Intimidation and rewards Powerful groups, when
they are involved in something potentially seen as unjust,
may seek to reduce public outrage by intimidating or
rewarding people involved, including victims, witnesses,
journalists and campaigners. Even the threat of sanctions
may be enough to silence those who would otherwise
speak out. Intimidation and rewards are not necessarily
deceptive in themselves, but they can enable deception.
In the case of torture at Abu Ghraib and other US
foreign prisons, it was risky to be a whistleblower: speaking out about torture was hazardous for the person who
spoke out. For example, Sergeant Frank “Greg” Ford
reported witnessing torture by fellow soldiers. In response,
he was forcibly taken out of Iraq on psychiatric grounds,
though psychiatrists later said he was completely sane.
Other military whistleblowers were treated the same way.
On the other hand, there were rewards for those who toed
the US government line. US media companies were
initially reluctant to break the Abu Ghraib story, valuing
their relationship with the US government. Only when
another outlet was planning to expose the torture did the
reward of breaking a big story outweigh going against the
government.
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Layers of secrecy
Deception by authorities almost always involves layers of
secrecy. To say something is being covered up is to
assume that some people really know what’s happening:
they are not deceived. The torture at Abu Ghraib was
known to the prison guard perpetrators, obviously enough,
as well as the prisoners. After Joseph Darby obtained two
discs with the photos of torture and abuse and submitted
them to authorities, knowledge about the events reached a
wider circle; this continued as more officials were brought
into the investigation. Journalists and editors learned about
the torture, but even then it was secret so far as wider
audiences were involved. Only after the story became
headline news was secrecy fully breached.
Secrecy can be likened to an onion. There are some
people, at the core of the onion, who are knowledgeable
while outer layers are ignorant. Some secrets remain at the
core of the onion whereas others, as in the Abu Ghraib
story, eventually reach more and more outer layers. The
idea of layers of secrecy is important in any study of
deception involving more than a few people. If a friend is
stealing from your fridge and keeping it a secret, and no
one but the two of you cares about the issue, then it is
pointless to talk about layers of secrecy. In contrast, in a
major issue of public importance, there can be many
layers. Furthermore, knowledge of something being kept
secret is not just a matter of yes or no: often there are
different levels of understanding, with those at the core
usually knowing more — though it is always possible they
are mistaken or even deceived.
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Media organisations, government officials and activists today know about Abu Ghraib photos that have never
been released, and also may know about other torture
centres and about high-level responsibility. Much of this
information is publicly available in the sense that an
assiduous citizen can track much of it down, but nevertheless it remains secret or obscure for most people whose
knowledge of the scandal derives from mass media
accounts.
The T4 programme
People sometimes imagine that ruthless governments can
do anything they like with impunity. One favourite
example is the Soviet government under Stalin, responsible for killing millions of people. Another is the German
government under Hitler, also responsible for millions of
deaths. Yet even such governments cannot get away with
anything they please. They commonly use deception to
reduce outrage from their murderous policies. Here I’ll use
the example of the Nazi T4 programme to kill people with
disabilities, initiated in Hitler’s Germany, and implemented by German doctors. The entire programme was
based on secrecy and deception, reducing outrage by using
the five methods already outlined.7
Cover-up The Nazi T4 programme was initiated in
1939 but was not publicly announced or explained. Quite
7 This case study is drawn from my paper “Euthanasia tactics:
patterns of injustice and outrage,” SpringerPlus, Vol. 2, No. 256,
6 June 2013, http://www.springerplus.com/content/2/1/256. References for all statements are contained in this article.
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the contrary: great efforts were made to keep it secret. To
run the programme, the obscure agency KdF (Chancellery
of the Führer) was chosen because of its small size and
low visibility.
Though the programme was classified top secret,
many knew about it, notably the doctors involved. They
were perpetrators and aided in the cover-up. They hid their
actions from those most likely to be disturbed by and to
protest against the killings, including relatives, members
of the Catholic Church, and foreign populations. After
public protest led to the closing of two killing centres,
transit institutions were created to add greater secrecy to
the process.
Devaluation Under Nazi rule, people with disabilities
were commonly labelled “idiots,” “crazies” and “cripples.” Perpetrators used the expression “life unworthy of
life.” The eugenics movement, strong in Germany as well
as some other countries, devalued anyone deemed to have
defective genes. The Nazis produced propaganda films
denigrating people with disabilities. For example, the 1936
film Erbkrank was intended to justify the compulsory
sterilisation of people with intellectual and physical disabilities by portraying them as criminals and subhuman.
Devaluation, at a psychological level, also helped enable
the killings.
Reinterpretation Language is the most obvious part
of reinterpretation: the Nazis used the terms “euthanasia”
and “mercy death” to describe the killings, which otherwise would be called murder. Another reinterpretation
technique was to rationalise killings by saying that people
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in institutions were expensive drains on the Nazi state
when facilities were needed for injured soldiers.
Outright lying was another standard reinterpretation
technique. For example, patients from institutions were
transferred to other centres for killing, with guards in
white coats in attendance to make it seem like a medically
supervised process. Parents were told that their children
were being sent to special centres where they would
receive better treatment. Relatives were sent death certificates with false information about the cause of death. To
disguise the central direction of the programme, physicians and administrators used pseudonyms. Lying can
serve as a form of cover-up; it fits within the category of
reinterpretation when relatives knew that something had
happened — death of a loved one — but were deceived
about how and when it occurred.
Official channels The programme was never given
legal approval; Hitler refused this because the German
people would not support it. Instead, Hitler wrote a letter
privately authorising the programme and this letter was
used to convince some participants. A formal meeting
served to win over sceptical legal professionals.
In August 1941, possibly in response to public
criticism (see below), Hitler halted the programme, but
this official stop order was deceptive. The “halt” only
applied to killing centres and did not apply to children.
The killing programme continued, with physicians and
nurses outside of the nominated centres killing both
children and adults using starvation, tablets and injections,
until the end of World War II in 1945.
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It was only after the war that official channels,
namely courts, were used against the perpetrators. After
1947, the German Federal Republic judiciary mostly made
decisions that allowed T4 participants to rejoin German
professions, for example by terminating trials, acquitting
defendants or giving lenient sentences.
Intimidation Speaking out against Nazi policies was
always risky. Parents who refused permission for their
children with disabilities to be sent away were threatened
with being sent to work camps or having all their children
taken into state custody. After Bishop Galen’s sermon
condemning the T4 programme (discussed later), ordinary
Germans found to possess, circulate or discuss the sermon
were subject to reprisals including losing jobs, being sent
to concentration camps or execution.
The perpetrators of the Nazi T4 programme thus
relied on all five types of tactics to reduce outrage — a
very strong indication of the potential for popular outrage
about the programme. This is exactly what is to be
expected using this analysis of tactics: when powerful
perpetrators anticipate resistance, they are likely to use a
range of tactics that reduce outrage.
What then about challenging the programme? Methods of doing this can be categorised into five types of
counter-tactics to the five types of outrage-reduction
tactics.
Exposure The key to challenging cover-up is to get
information to receptive audiences. Information about the
T4 programme gradually leaked out via observations and
inferences by relatives and local people. The breakthrough
event was a 1941 pastoral letter by Clemens August von
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Galen, Catholic bishop of Münster, which was reprinted
and widely distributed throughout Germany.
Validation To challenge devaluation, the victims
needed to be conceived of as humans with lives worth
living. Von Galen, referring to the targets of the T4
programme, said “we are dealing with human beings, with
our neighbours, brothers and sisters,” describing them
positively in terms of vital relationships. (However, von
Galen was far less vocal about the value of Jewish lives.)
Reframing To counter techniques of lying, minimising, blaming and framing, the programme had to be named
as an injustice, namely killing pure and simple. One
asylum director, Heinrich Hermann, used the word
“killing” in criticising T4 to visiting euthanasia planners,
who were disconcerted by such direct language.
Mobilisation There are two ways to respond to
official channels used to give a deceptive appearance of
justice. One is to avoid or discredit the official channels.
In the long term, discrediting the Nazi regime accomplished this, so much so that virtually any Nazi policy was
discredited by association. The other response is to not
rely on official channels for redress but instead to mobilise
support among the public, for example by talking to
individuals, publicising the issues, holding private or
public meetings, forming networks and groups, and
making public protests.
For many months prior to von Galen’s pastoral letter,
various individual opponents of T4 — especially church
people — wrote letters to or had meetings with government officials, such as in the Ministry of Justice, but this
insider approach achieved little. These were significant
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signs of opposition but they were not so effective as
mobilising public support: they essentially relied on an
official channel, namely appealing to government officials, that gave only the appearance of offering a solution.
Resistance The counter to intimidation is to continue
taking action against the injustice and to expose evidence
of intimidation in order to create greater outrage. Those
who opposed the euthanasia programme at the time, in
word or deed, displayed incredible courage.
In summary, the Nazi T4 programme is an ideal illustration of an injustice in which all the methods of reducing
and fostering outrage can be observed. It shows the central
role of deception in protecting authorities from popular
resistance to their policies.
Political deception in New Zealand
In New Zealand in the years leading up to 2014, a political
blogger named Cameron Slater had huge influence. His
blog, named Whale Oil, was highly partisan and aggressive, with numerous posts attacking politicians and political initiatives.
One of Slater’s specialties was the sexual smear. He
would obtain information about a politician’s extra-marital
affairs and gradually present it over several days. Sometimes he would simply imply that a politician was
involved in a sexual scandal, without any evidence: this
was the technique of sexual innuendo.
Political blogs present themselves as sources of news
and commentary, but are not bound by the expectations
and practices common in conventional news media. Slater
could present claims and slurs that newspapers would not
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print but, once online, regular journalists and editors could
not resist the easy stories offered. Sometimes Slater fed
material directly to mass media journalists, giving them
scoops, always in the form of attack politics, targeting a
politician or policy proposal. The Whale Oil blog thus
served to lower the standard of political discourse in New
Zealand.
Slater presented the Whale Oil blog as independent.
It pursued a right-wing agenda, but sometimes attacked
politicians in the National Party, the right-leaning
dominant party. What most people didn’t know was that
Whale Oil involved a massive deception.
Someone leaked a massive file of Slater’s emails and
Facebook conversations to Nicky Hager, an investigative
writer who was the author of several path-breaking
exposés. Hager used the material in the files to write a
book titled Dirty Politics.8
According to Hager, Slater was not an independent
blogger. Behind the scenes, he was being fed information
from the office of John Key, the prime minister. Furthermore, an employee in the prime minister’s office drafted
some posts for Whale Oil, attacking the government’s
opponents. Slater also received information from government minister Judith Collins and from paying clients. For
example, a client — a candidate for National Party preselection in a safe seat — paid Slater to take down a
8 Nicky Hager, Dirty Politics: How Attack Politics Is Poisoning
New Zealand’s Political Environment (Nelson, New Zealand:
Craig Potton, 2014).
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political rival. Slater boasted to his friends about being
able to tear down front-runners for the selection and boost
a wealthy outsider. The key to this was collecting dirt and
publishing attacking comments on Whale Oil, while
posing as an independent commentator.
The appearance of independence was even more
important when running the agenda of the prime minister.
John Key presented himself as a positive figure, and didn’t
want to be implicated in sordid campaigning: that was
outsourced to Slater.
Slater, as well as making money from advertising on
Whale Oil and from clients, also had a personal agenda,
namely pursuing a far-right vision for New Zealand
politics. This involved trying to get far-right candidates
selected within the National Party, as well as attacking
politicians in the Labour Party and other parties on the
left.
Slater worked closely with several others, for example Simon Lusk, a strategy consultant for a National Party
member of parliament. Several of these allies would send
Slater completed articles; Slater would publish them under
his own name. This was systematic plagiarism, namely
taking the work or ideas of others and presenting them as
one’s own, and was another form of deception.
Slater had help from inside government bureaucracies. On quite a few occasions, he or his sources would
apply for government documents using New Zealand’s
freedom-of-information legislation, and receive them far
more quickly than usual requests. He or his sources
somehow knew exactly what to ask for, which was
material that could be used to discredit political targets.
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Slater would prepare a series of blog posts hinting at
exposures, while waiting for documents to arrive. So there
was another form of deception concerning misuse of
inside information from within government bureaucracies.
Hager in Dirty Politics gives exquisite detail about
Whale Oil and associated political operations, showing
that how attack politics was based on systematic deception. Hager notes that members of the public normally
have no way of knowing they are being hoodwinked and
that political agendas are being driven by special interests.
Hager’s book suggests that whenever a political scandal
becomes big news, it is wise to be sceptical: it is quite
possible that the scandal has been manufactured out of
little or nothing, and that it is being driven by players who
do not reveal their agendas.
Propaganda
When officials present slanted perspectives, it is sometimes called propaganda. This term gained notoriety by its
use in so-called totalitarian regimes, of which the Soviet
Union and Nazi Germany are exemplars. George Orwell
in his famous novel 1984 offered a chilling portrait of
society in which government propaganda dominates
public perceptions, in the most stark fashion: the society is
involved in continual warfare, but this is called peace, and
archives are rewritten so that recorded history conforms to
current government dogma.
“If you tell a big enough lie and tell it frequently
enough, it will be believed.” ― Adolf Hitler
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Today, some of these same processes have become
standard in countries that are nominally free. Governments
employ communication specialists to sell policies to the
electorate, using various techniques to make outcomes
desired by the government seem worthwhile and to ignore
or discredit undesired ones. Public relations is the
common term for referring to the work of these specialists,
who are also called spin doctors, with spin being the angle
or perspective emphasised by the way a message is
framed.9
Spin doctoring is the government version of advertising, which itself is a pervasive form of propaganda, most
commonly on behalf of corporations. Of course advertisements come in all shapes and sizes. A grocer advertising the price of apples and oranges is not being particularly deceptive, even if some other fruits are overpriced
and poor quality. It is more relevant to apply the label of
propaganda to ads that provide little information while
conveying images that appeal to unconscious drives.
Tobacco companies have excelled at propaganda.
Those who lived through the era when cigarette ads were
freely broadcast on television will remember the associations of smoking with being cool, fresh and healthy.
9 For example, Anthony R. Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson, Age of
Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion (New
York: Freeman, 1992); Douglas Rushkoff, Coercion: The Persuasion Professionals and Why We Listen to What They Say
(London: Little, Brown, 2000); Norman Solomon, War Made
Easy: How Presidents and Pundits Keep Spinning Us to Death
(Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2005).
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Indeed, it was the genius of cigarette ads to associate
smoking with young appealing models, enticing teenagers
to smoke in order to be sophisticated and women to smoke
to be liberated. These days, in some countries, antismoking ads feature pictures of smokers with black lungs
and horrific-looking cancers.
Governments and corporations are the major purveyors of slanted messages, but now nearly every organisation
has to compete in the information marketplace, presenting
a favourable image. This includes churches, trade unions,
political parties, doctors, lawyers and environmental
organisations. Massaging the message is so standard that it
would be shocking for any group to present an honest
picture of itself. This would be equivalent to a supermodel
or celebrity presented without the usual attention to dress,
makeup and facial expression. Paparazzi go in search of
candid photos of celebrities, of wider interest precisely
because they are unstaged.
Because the word “propaganda” has connotations of
conscious deception by authoritarian governments, it may
be better to use other expressions to refer to deception by
authorities, including image management, spin-doctoring
or biased reporting. The apparently neutral term “public
relations” has acquired negative associations, being associated with managing a public image by highlighting
positives and hiding negatives.
There is actually a continuity between deception by
authorities and by individuals. Most people could be said
to manage their image in various ways, for example by
smiling insincerely, making Facebook posts to create a
desired impression, and not revealing ulterior motives.
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The problem with deception by authorities is not so much
that there is more of it, but that authorities have more
power, so their deceptions can be more damaging. If
power tends to corrupt, then deception in the service of
power is dangerous.
Propaganda, take two
In regular propaganda, an organisation is overt in what it
does, for example making statements. The statements may
be false or misleading, but at least everyone knows the
organisation is making them. This can be called white
propaganda.
Then there’s black propaganda, in which authorities
pretend to be someone else. This method has become
more commonplace with the presence on the Internet of
“sock puppets,” which are people using false names. Let’s
say there is a discussion of some controversial topic, such
as racism or abortion. A sock puppet can enter the discussion and pretend to have extreme views in order to
discredit them. For example, an anti-racist campaigner
might enter an anti-immigration discussion group and
pretend to be a racist with extreme views. This might
alienate some of the more moderate members of the
group.
Another level of deception is for this sock puppet to
take on someone else’s identity, for example making posts
or sending messages that purport to be legitimate. If you
receive an email from me, with my name and email
address presented in the usual (or a convincing) way, then
you assume I sent it. But it’s possible that someone has
forged both the message and my email address.
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Some spam involves forging identities. You might
receive a message purporting to be from a bank asking
you to log in to receive a payment, or a message purporting to be from a telecommunications company asking you
to log in to fix a problem. Because this sort of deception is
so common, relatively few people are tricked; for those
who are fooled, the consequences can be serious.
An example of black propaganda is for a government
to run a radio station that presents itself as being on the
other side, in order to discredit the other side.10 For example, during the cold war, the CIA ran a radio station from
Taiwan falsely presenting itself as the voice of dissidents
in mainland China. Black propaganda can involve actions,
not just words. One well-documented plan by the CIA in
the 1970s was called Operation Northwoods. The idea was
to carry out terrorist actions against the US people but
make them appear to be carried out by the Cuban government, then led by Fidel Castro and seen as an enemy by
the US government. The idea was for this “false flag”
operation to trigger outrage against the Castro regime and
enable the US military to launch an invasion of Cuba to
overthrow the government.
Black propaganda is often hard to prove. Documents
about Operation Northwoods became public, but in many
cases there are only suspicions and heated debates. One of
the allegations against the government of Syria led by alAssad, engaged in a war against a number of opponents, is
10 Lawrence C. Soley and John S. Nichols, Clandestine Radio
Broadcasting: A Study of Revolutionary and Counterrevolutionary Electronic Communication (New York: Praeger, 1987).
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that it has covertly aided Islamic State, nominally one of
its enemies, by releasing Islamic militants from prison and
not bombing Islamic State positions. The reason for such
apparently strange behaviour is that if al-Assad’s enemies
are seen to be Islamic terrorists, then all the Syrian
government’s opponents will be discredited, and outside
interventions will be targeted at Islamic State, not the
Syrian government. Meanwhile, Syrian government forces
can concentrate their efforts against its other enemies.11
This sounds complicated and conspiratorial, and it is.
Black propaganda by its nature is devious. Even when
exposed, it is easy to disavow: because of the complications and apparent contradictions, few members of the
public will bother to investigate in sufficient depth to
determine what is actually happening. Even journalists
will be discouraged from doing stories by the time
required and the complexity involved.
In between white and black propaganda, there is
another category: grey propaganda. This includes cases in
which the evidence is not clear or the motivations of
participants are hard to determine. Consider the case of the
2003 invasion of Iraq, which was justified by George W.
Bush, Dick Cheney and other senior US officials on the
basis that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein was acquiring
weapons of mass destruction and had links with the
terrorist group al-Qaeda. Bush and Cheney did everything
they could to make the case for war. Were they lying?
11 Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of
Terror (New York: Regan Arts, 2015), pp. 144–149 and
elsewhere.
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Subsequent investigations showed that Saddam
Hussein had been telling the truth about not having
weapons of mass destruction. Nor was there any good
evidence that his resolutely secular regime had any
sympathy or connections with al-Qaeda. Bush, Cheney et
al. may have wanted to launch an invasion for other
reasons, and needed a justification so badly that they
believed informants who told them what they wanted to
hear but would in other circumstances have been
dismissed as flaky. This is an example in which deception
and self-deception reinforce each other. It is plausible to
argue that Bush and Cheney wanted to believe in pretexts
for invasion and ended up believing them, enabling them
to be sincere in the way they sold the invasion to the US
public.
There are other grey cases. The Tonkin Bay incident
in 1964, in which North Vietnamese patrol boats supposedly fired on a US ship, was used by the US administration as a trigger for pushing through a Congressional
motion that escalated the Vietnam war. But this might
have been a false alarm: the evidence that North Vietnamese patrol boats were present and had actually fired was
ambiguous.12 Cases like this show that authorities can
choose to use ambiguity to their advantage, interpreting
events and evidence in a way that serves their agendas.
This is not a planned black operation, in which the intent
is to deceive the public. In grey operations, there can be a
combination of deception and self-deception.
12 Daniel Ellsberg, Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the
Pentagon Papers (New York: Viking, 2002).

50

The deceptive activist

Infiltration and disruption
Governments and corporations sometimes seek to undermine challengers by infiltration and disruption. In the
famous McLibel case, the food corporation McDonald’s in
the late 1980s hired spies (infiltrators) to attend meetings
of London Greenpeace, an anarchist group not linked to
Greenpeace International. The group, which had only a
handful of activists, at the time was producing a leaflet
titled “What’s wrong with McDonald’s?” giving information about adverse health effects of McDonald’s food,
poor treatment of McDonald’s workers, impacts on the
Amazon rainforest by beef production for McDonald’s
burgers, and other alleged McDonald’s shortcomings. The
infiltrators collected information about the leaflet, and the
company then threatened to sue five London Greenpeace
members for libel.
This backfired on McDonald’s. Three London Greenpeace members acquiesced, but two — Helen Steel and
Dave Morris — defended the legal action, in the process
triggering a massive campaign that was a public relations
disaster for McDonald’s.13
The issue here is the deception involved in infiltration. The infiltrators presented themselves as genuinely
interested in London Greenpeace’s efforts. This sort of
deception can lead to distrust and paranoia.
In some ways, just the possibility of infiltration can
be damaging to an action group, reducing trust among
13 John Vidal, McLibel (London: Macmillan, 1997); see also
Fiona J. L. Donson, Legal Intimidation: A SLAPP in the Face of
Democracy (London: Free Association Books, 2000).
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members and sometimes creating suspicions about those
who are genuine. In some cases, infiltrators develop close
personal relationships with regular members, and even
have children with them, and are so trusted that when the
infiltration is exposed, members refuse to believe it.14
Infiltration usually serves to collect information. It
can also involve disruption. An infiltrator can pose as an
extreme militant, encouraging the use of violent tactics
and even helping organise them. The point is to discredit
the movement: when the group uses violence, it is easier
for the government to justify repressive measures.
In the US government’s COINTELPRO programme,
which ran from the 1950s to the 1970s, attempts were
made to disrupt social movements. One technique was to
write fake letters, purporting to be from another activist
group, with the intent of encouraging rivalries and distrust.
The essence of the programme was to use deceptive
methods to undermine trust and promote discord.15
Lies by authorities
Police, when arresting or interrogating suspects, may lie as
a means of obtaining what they want: acquiescence,
admissions, information, confessions. A typical technique
is to make threats: “You’re going to go to prison, and be
14 Eveline Lubbers, Secret Manoeuvres in the Dark: Corporate
and Police Spying on Activists (London: Pluto Press, 2012).
15 Nelson Blackstock, Cointelpro: The FBI’s Secret War on
Political Freedom (New York: Vintage, 1976); Paul Cowan, Nick
Egleson and Nat Hentoff, State Secrets: Police Surveillance in
America (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1974).
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raped.” Another sort of lie by police occurs in court, when
officers lie about what happened, for example claiming the
defendant assaulted them, when actually it was the police
who assaulted the defendant. This technique, called
verballing, is only sometimes exposed when there are
independent witnesses, videos or other contradictory
evidence.
To say that police lie is not to paint them as particularly corrupt. In many cases, they lie to achieve what they
believe is justice. For example, they may have lots of
evidence about a person’s criminal behaviour but nothing
admissible in court, so lying to obtain a conviction seems
justified. Furthermore, many criminals lie routinely, so
lying by police is nothing special. The main distinction is
the difference in power between police and their targets.
When authorities have a lot more power, their lies usually
have greater consequences, and there is a greater potential
for abuse.
Sometimes police, in search of a murderer, choose
the wrong person, intentionally or unintentionally. In
intentional cases — which might be motivated by payback
against someone they have a grudge against — the police
collude to build a case against the person, who is framed
and may go to prison for the murder. Lying is central to
frame-ups. Months or years down the track, supporters of
the innocent person, now in jail, may seek to reopen the
case, offering new evidence and pointing to flaws in the
prosecution case. Many police, embarrassed by evidence
suggesting their own incompetence or complicity, resist
any reconsideration. This may not be conscious, but
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instead be confirmation bias: police interpret every new
bit of information in terms of their preconceived ideas.16
Clergy are authorities. They do not have legal power
to command members of the church, but they have moral
authority. In more hierarchical churches, for example the
Catholic Church, leaders have enormous authority, with
parishioners seeing their priests as agents of God, to be
obeyed without question. In this context, when priests
sexually abuse children, the interaction of deception and
authority is especially toxic. Such priests — only a small
minority — carefully select their targets and groom them
with gradually escalating requests and actions. The
grooming process is itself built on a lie. Then the priest
uses various techniques to discourage the child from
saying anything about the abuse. The young targets
seldom have the emotional maturity to understand what is
happening, and join in the deception, not telling anyone,
and carrying the burden of a secret for years, decades,
even their entire lives. Then there is the deception by
church leaders who are informed about the abuse and,
instead of expelling the perpetrators from the church and
reporting them to the police, transfer them to another
parish, where they continue the same behaviours. Sexual
abuse in churches thus involves deception at several
levels.

16 Matthew Syed, Black Box Thinking: Marginal Gains and the
Secrets of High Performance (London: John Murray, 2016).
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Reluctance to release information
Organisational elites seek to control public perceptions.
They use public relations strategies to present positive
images about the organisation, frame narratives from a
favourable angle, and hide or deny negatives. These
methods are deceptive separately and in combination. The
most visible elements are the presentation of positive
images and the use of flattering framing. In the background is hiding of negatives. Perhaps fortunately, hiding
information opens organisations to the possibility of
exposure and exposés, though these too can be misleading.
In their quest for a positive public image, organisations try to hide what would contradict or otherwise harm
such an image. Much of what goes on in organisations is
routine and of little interest to anyone, but in most organisations there are secrets that are kept closely under wraps.
Those who expose such secrets — whistleblowers, journalists, oversight agencies — are seen as threats.
For most governments, secrecy is standard operating
procedure. It took years of campaigning to bring in
freedom-of-information laws, and they are often expensive
and difficult to use, requiring persistence to obtain crucial
secrets.
Most corporations are even more resistant to exposing internal problems, and they can block enquiries by
invoking confidentiality, commercial secrecy and privacy
concerns. They can also destroy information. Fred Gulson
was a tobacco company insider who became a whistleblower, testifying about the company’s “document retention policy,” which actually was an operation to shred
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huge volumes of documents about what the company
knew about the health hazards of smoking.
Secrecy is one of the primary means by which
authorities are able to deceive outsiders.
Governments and protest
After nuclear weapons were built during World War II and
huge arsenals created in subsequent decades, threatening
global devastation, there has been continual citizen
protest, including upsurges of massive opposition. Going
by what government spokespeople say, none of this
protest has had the slightest impact on official decisionmaking. However, they are lying.
Lawrence Wittner carried out an exhaustive examination of the worldwide movement against nuclear weapons,
including examining records of US government discussions about nuclear weapons development and deployment
and about negotiations to control and reduce arsenals.
Contrary to their public statements, government leaders
were acutely sensitive to protest. Wittner concluded that
arsenals expanded when there was little public opposition
and were restrained or reduced when the public outcry was
greatest.17
The lesson from this is to never believe what government leaders say about whether and how they were
influenced. Even when they actually understand the
impact of protest on their own decisions, they are unlikely
to admit it.
17 Lawrence S. Wittner, The Struggle Against the Bomb, 3
volumes (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993–2003).
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Deception in science
Scientists are often considered to be authorities, in terms
of their expertise rather than their formal position or their
ability to control others. Scientific research is a domain in
which truth-telling is fundamental to the entire enterprise.
If scientists, when writing research papers, intentionally
deceived others, science as we know it could hardly exist.
If the author of a scientific paper could twist findings,
readers would not know whether to trust them. This helps
explain why fraud in science — generally taken to refer to
altering or manufacturing data — is treated as a major
transgression. This sort of scientific fraud can be detected
in various ways, including by reports from whistleblowers
and by the detection of anomalies in data and methods.
Despite the importance of truth-telling in science, and
indeed in scholarship more generally, there are a number
of deceptions embedded in publication conventions and
the image of science. Consider the scientific paper,
typically a concise summary of the research topic, the
methods used, the findings and their implications. Scientists know that research papers follow a convention, and
do not provide a description of the way research is
actually carried out. Chemists do not write “We spilled
some chemicals and noticed an unusual colour. So we
investigated further and discovered we were looking for
the wrong thing.” Such honesty about the research process
is rare, indeed so rare that a prominent scientist once wrote
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that the scientific paper is fraudulent.18 If so, it’s only false
to outsiders, because scientists know that published papers
are telling a story according to a formula.
Another type of deception involves the image of
science, the standard picture being that scientists are
objective, dispassionate searchers for the truth. The
reality, known to most researchers, is that scientists can be
highly emotional and in particular highly committed to
their ideas, so much so that they often maintain them in
the face of contrary evidence.19 Many top scientists are
competitive, seeking to obtain fame via their research, and
sometimes engage in bitter disputes over priority for
discoveries. Actually, many scientists believe in this storybook image: they think they actually are objective. This is
a type of collective self-deception, in which the conventions of science, and the images conveyed in science
textbooks, are taken as reality.
The image of the sober, dispassionate scientist —
enhanced by the formulaic scientific paper — is useful
when researchers make pronouncements: they have more
credibility when seen as objective, with subjective
elements submerged or disguised. When a government or
18 P. B. Medawar, “Is the scientific paper fraudulent? Yes; it
misrepresents scientific thought,” Saturday Review, 1 August
1964, pp. 42–43.
19 Michael J. Mahoney, Scientist as Subject: The Psychological
Imperative (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1976); Ian I. Mitroff, The
Subjective Side of Science (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1974); David
Lindsay Watson, Scientists are Human (London: Watts & Co.,
1938).
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company wants to defend its policy or plan, finding some
willing scientists can be effective in offering legitimacy.
The scientists are presented as objective and contrasted to
citizen opponents who are stigmatised as subjective and
hence easily dismissed.
There is also another aspect of deception in science:
companies may fund research that serves their interests,
manipulate results, hide unwelcome findings, and use
publications as tools for marketing campaigns. This sort of
deception is widespread in biomedical fields, for example
in research on pharmaceutical drugs.20
To refer to scholarship as a domain for truth-telling is
most accurate when vested interests play little role and
when researchers have little to gain by exaggerating or
distorting their findings, and can easily be exposed when
they do. The more general point is that even domains
where truth-telling is vital can be plagued by passions,
biases and the presence of vested interests. Whenever an
area develops a reputation for honesty, it is predictable
that interlopers will try to benefit from a false impression
that they too are honest.
Conclusion
Types of deception by authorities are mostly similar to
those between individuals. There are benign, conventional
lies, and there are some major, damaging lies. The main
difference is that deceptions by authorities affect a lot
20 Peter C. Gøtzsche, Deadly Medicines and Organised Crime:
How Big Pharma Has Corrupted Healthcare (London: Radcliffe,
2013).
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more people and can influence policies and practices with
long-term implications.
Anyone who comes up against authorities — that’s
just about everyone — needs to know about how they can
be deceptive, intentionally or otherwise. Protesters need to
understand police deceptions; election campaigners need
to understand political lying; employees, especially
whistleblowers, need to understand lying by managers;
soldiers need to understand lying by their commanders;
citizens need to understand lying by national leaders.
Despite the importance of understanding lying by
authorities, many people give them the benefit of the
doubt. They have a “truth bias,” assuming authorities are
telling the whole truth unless there is convincing evidence
to the contrary. Despite politicians repeatedly breaking
campaign promises, many voters treat new promises with
undue regard.
On the other hand, it is possible to become too
cynical, not believing anything a politician or a corporate
boss says. This points to the need for reliable methods of
detecting lies. This is the topic of the next chapter.

4
Detection
Key points
• Most people can’t detect lying through behavioural cues.
• To detect deception, it’s useful to assess a speaker’s
track record, the context and motivations.
• Evidence is often the most powerful tool for detecting
deception.
Many people believe they can tell when someone is lying.
Parents think they can tell when their children are lying.
Police think they can tell when suspects are lying. Bosses
think they can tell when subordinates are lying.
How do they know? Sometimes it’s an intuitive
sense. Other times it’s based on specific observations: the
other person is looking away, fidgeting, blinking more
than normal, or any of a number of other tell-tale signs of
body language.
“It is always the best policy to speak the truth, unless
of course you are an exceptionally good liar.” —
Jerome Jerome, The Idler

Researchers have sought to test whether people are
any good at detecting lies. As noted in chapter 2, most
student nurses can be very good at concealing their
emotions and lying about whether they have seen a gory
medical video or a pleasant scene. By looking at the
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student nurses, observers could not tell which video they
had seen.1 This same finding has been replicated many
times. The basic result is that lots of people think they can
detect lies, but very few can actually do so better than
chance. In other words, their lie-detection skills are no
better than guessing.
When little children lie, they often give themselves
away. Two-year-old Jessica says about her toy duck “I
didn’t take Freddie” while holding Freddie in her hand.
“In its natural state, the child tells the literal truth
because it is too naive to think of anything else.
Blurting out the complete truth is considered adorable
in the young, right smack up to the moment that the
child says, ‘Mommy, is this the fat lady you can’t
stand?’” — Judith Martin, Miss Manners’ Guide to
Rearing Perfect Children (1985)

But as children get older, they become much better liars.
In this, they are often trained by parents and others in their
lives. “Be sure to tell grandmother that you really like the
present she gave you.” “Don’t tell your mother I gave this
[chocolate] to you.” “Tell Sal [who has just called] that
I’m not here.” Most of these are white lies, told for innocuous social purposes. Others are more serious. “Tell your
1 Paul Ekman, Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace,
Politics, and Marriage (New York: Norton, 1985/2009), pp. 54–
56. For a comprehensive treatment of lie detection, see Aldert
Vrij, Detecting Lies and Deceit: Pitfalls and Opportunities, 2nd
edition (Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2008).
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mother I’m staying late at work.” “Tell the shopkeeper
that you put the [stolen] goods in your bag by mistake.”
Because parents and other people in a child’s life
commonly provide training and role models for lying, it is
hardly surprising that most children become pretty good at
it. The only surprise is that when children get a bit older,
so many parents think they can tell when the kids are
lying.
There may be a few people who actually are good at
detecting lies just by observing someone’s body language.
Members of the US Secret Service, who scan crowds
looking for threats as part of their job, apparently can
become skilled at lie-detection, but are still far from
perfect, guessing correctly around 64% of the time
compared to a bit over 50% for police officers, university
students and various other groups.2
The conclusion is that few humans are good at detecting lies just through observation, and most do no better
than chance. The trap is false confidence, as when police,
bosses or parents think they know when someone is telling
the truth just by talking to them, or even think they can tell
by looking whether someone is honest. It’s better to
assume you have no clue and thus not rely on observation,
but use other methods.
2 Paul Ekman and Maureen O’Sullivan, “Who can catch a liar?”
American Psychologist, Vol. 46, No. 9, September 1991, pp. 913–
920. Whether there are individuals with exceptional capabilities
to detect deception has been questioned: Charles F. Bond, Jr. and
Ahmet Uysal, “On lie detection ‘wizards’,” Law and Human
Behavior, Vol. 31, No. 1, February 2007, pp. 109–115.
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What about the polygraph, commonly called a liedetector? This is a machine hooked up to detect a person’s
physiological signs such as heart rate and blood pressure.
The polygraph doesn’t detect lies, but instead only the
bodily responses that some people have when they lie. If
you’re calm when you tell the truth but become emotionally aroused when saying something you know is false —
your heart races a bit — then a polygraph, with a skilled
operator, can detect when you’re lying.
However, polygraph tests are not reliable. Some
people can lie without a worry, so the polygraph shows
nothing different. Psychopaths, who lack a conscience,
can do this, and others can train themselves to be calm
when lying. Then there are people who are so nervous that
when telling the truth on a sensitive matter the polygraph
response indicates they are lying. They are so worried by
the process that it gives a false positive, namely registering lying when they are telling the truth. Finally, people
who have deceived themselves, namely who believe their
own lies, will pass a polygraph examination. That’s
because they think they are telling the truth.
To look more systematically at ways to detect deception, it’s useful to classify methods into three main types:
assess the speaker, check the evidence, and assess history
and context. These are summarised in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1. Methods of detecting deception3
1. Assess the speaker
• use behavioural clues
• assess the speaker’s track record
• evaluate motives and incentives
2. Uncover and analyse the evidence
• assess whether the evidence has been a reliable
indicator previously
• expose conflicting claims and statements
• clarify key points and concepts
• compare with other views; undertake research
• test veracity (individually): check facts, obtain
statistics
• test veracity (collectively): get a group together to
bring out suppressed information and perspectives;
cultivate whistleblowers, leakers, internal
sympathisers, investigative journalists
• self-deception: search for contrary evidence
3. Assess history and context
• assess past circumstances for their correlation with
lying
• assess incentives for lying provided by the context,
for example money or reprisals
• look at environmental clues concerning deception,
for example patterns of collusion or self-interest
3

Adapted from a table in Brian Martin, “Tactics of political lying:
the Iguanas affair,” Journal of Language and Politics, Vol. 13,
No. 4, 2014, pp. 837–856, at p. 845.
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Assess the speaker
Behavioural clues
As already discussed, most people aren’t very good at
using behavioural clues, though many people think they
are. However, most people have no training in using
behavioural clues and have a potential to learn.
Most people are very good at hiding their feelings.
When someone says something upsetting, they may mask
their feelings of disgust or fear by smiling. However, just
before their smile, there may be a very brief expression of
their true feeling, called a micro-expression. It is so brief,
just a fraction of a second, that it is easy to miss. Through
practice, though, it’s possible to become better at two
things: seeing the micro-expression and correctly interpreting it, for example as disgust or fear.4
A fake smile, that feigns the feeling of happiness, is
easy to do, but fake smiles are subtly different from
genuine smiles, called Duchesne smiles. A fake smile just
involves the muscles around the mouth, whereas a
Duchesne smile also engages small muscles around the
eyes, which is quite hard to do voluntarily, without the
accompanying positive feeling.
So if you see Sally smile, through practice you
should be able to detect whether there was a preliminary
micro-expression, to interpret this micro-expression, and
to check whether the smile is fake or genuine. Let’s say
4 Paul Ekman, Emotions Revealed: Recognizing Faces and
Feelings to Improve Communication and Emotional Life (New
York: Times Books, 2003).
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you detect a feeling of fear masked by a fake smile. Does
this mean Sally is consciously deceptive? Not necessarily.
It might indicate an unconscious fear. It might be useful to
know this.
The next question is whether you do anything about
your extra insight into Sally’s emotions. It might not be a
wise idea to ask her whether she’s afraid, because this
might upset her for no useful purpose. If you don’t say
anything but keep your information to yourself, now it’s
you being deceptive! But this is to get ahead of the story.
For now, I’m discussing detecting deception; what to do
about knowledge of deception is another stage.
Suppose you think Sally is unconsciously hiding a
fear resulting from something you’ve said. But how can
you be sure? Even if you’re highly skilled at detecting
micro-expressions, you can make mistakes. So it’s a good
idea to check your interpretation of Sally’s response.
Perhaps you’ve been talking about putting a protest banner
on a high building. Sally might be afraid of heights but not
want to show it among activists she respects, and you later
observe her avoiding looking down from three floors up.
Or perhaps you’ve been talking about the effects of
nuclear war, and Sally is afraid of death. However, that
wouldn’t be a surprise, because most people are afraid of
death. You might learn more about how this is likely to
affect Sally by reading about terror management theory5

5 Jeff Greenberg, Sheldon Solomon and Tom Pyszczynski,
“Terror management theory of self-esteem and cultural
worldviews: empirical assessments and conceptual refinements,”
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— being reminded about death can affect people’s
behaviour without them being aware of it — than by
trying to observe her response to actual risks of dying.
The implication here is that it may be possible to
become much better at reading people’s emotions from
their face — or their voice or body language — but this
may require a fair bit of practice. Furthermore, you need
independent information to check your assessment
obtained from behavioural clues.
Assess the speaker’s track record
If you know that someone has lied repeatedly before, this
is an indication they are prone to lying. Some people are
called habitual liars: they make up all sorts of stories,
about what they own, where they went to school, who they
know and what they’ve done. When caught out in a lie,
they blithely switch to another.
Occasionally a well-known figure is exposed for
having deceived others for many years. Bruno Bettelheim
was a prominent child psychologist and writer whose
books were read by many as revealing truths about human
behaviour. Then, much later, Richard Pollak wrote a book
about Bettelheim, showing that throughout his life he had
misrepresented his own past and that many of his research
findings were suspect.6 If, much earlier, someone had
made a careful analysis of Bettelheim’s claims, Bettelheim
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 29, 1997, pp.
61–139.
6 Richard Pollak, The Creation of Dr. B: A Biography of Bruno
Bettelheim (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

68

The deceptive activist

might not have been taken so seriously. Even so, Pollak’s
critique offers a warning about being too trusting.
Some politicians make all sorts of promises during
election campaigns, and then go back on them after
getting into office, using various excuses. These broken
promises can almost become predictable.
For decades, the tobacco industry covered up internal
knowledge of the harmful effects of smoking. Now that
this cover-up has been exposed, this could be a warning
not to trust anything tobacco companies say about the
health hazards of smoking.
On the other hand, some people have a reputation for
being honest, for telling it like it is, for being straight
shooters. Some even are known for being honest when no
one else has the courage to speak out, for example dissidents in China or Iran. If there is good evidence for a
person’s reputation for honesty, this is a recommendation
for believing them.
However, a lot of care is needed when using this
criterion for detecting deceit. A dissident might be courageous in speaking truth in the face of government repression, but still be cautious, only speaking out on carefully
chosen times and topics. Furthermore, courage in dissent
does not necessarily carry over into honesty in personal
dealings. Some prominent figures have secret lives.
Whether being selectively honest is a problem depends on
your values, and what is at stake.
One problem in relying on a track record is that track
records themselves can become a target for attack. To
attack a political opponent, campaigners may monitor
every statement, finding one instance of an alleged lie
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(which might just be a mistake), and then trumpet this lie
endlessly, seeking to discredit the politician’s reputation
for honesty. When Julia Gillard was prime minister of
Australia, her opponents, led by Tony Abbott, leader of
the opposition, relentlessly accused her of lying about an
election promise concerning a carbon tax, labelling her Juliar.7 Gillard lost the next election, and Abbott became
prime minister and proceeded to break numerous election
promises.
In the midst of all the clamour, it would be difficult
to make an assessment of Gillard’s and Abbott’s track
record concerning election promises. Was Gillard especially duplicitous, or were Abbott and company especially
ruthless in exaggerating one alleged deception into a longrunning slur? Did Abbott really break more election
promises than Gillard, and were they more significant? A
dispassionate, non-partisan assessment is needed, and this
would be extremely difficult given media management
strategies by both political parties.
Making an informed judgement about the track
record of an individual or organisation is important, yet it
is often bypassed because of the truth bias: many people
assume others are telling the truth unless there is persuasive evidence to the contrary. If Alpha, a member of your
group, has been telling damaging lies for years, this should
be taken into account, even though this time the topic is
different, and there are new members who don’t know
Alpha and are willing to accept statements at face value.
7 Kerry-Anne Walsh, The Stalking of Julia Gillard (Sydney:
Allen & Unwin, 2013).
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The truth bias is especially damaging when dealing
with authorities. In court, some police have a long track
record of verballing those accused of crimes, namely lying
in order to convict them. Judges may know about this but
do nothing, even though perjury is a crime. Meanwhile,
juries are not told anything about the practice of verballing, much less about the reliability of police witnesses. So
the practice continues.
The role of a track record applies to organisations and
to social systems. Just because a tobacco company has a
new spokesperson does not mean that suddenly the truth
will come out. In this case, the pattern of deception is
institutionalised. It should be assumed that the pattern will
continue. Only if there is a sudden change in the message
should the possibility of truth-telling be taken seriously.
The example of a tobacco company is easy to grasp,
but the same approach is less commonly applied to
governments, at least governments that are considered
friendly. Consider the issue of torture. Every government
in the world denies engaging in torture. Informed groups,
such as Amnesty International, document torture in dozens
of countries. So the governments of dozens of countries
are involved in systematic deception. Perhaps a government spokesperson is being personally honest in saying
there is no torture, because the spokesperson is being
deceived by others in the system. The point is that deception is institutionalised, and the honesty of a spokesperson
is a related but not essential issue.
For getting at the track record of a corporate sector
(like the tobacco industry) or a government, detailed
investigation is vital. One of the patterns perceived by
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political scientists is that left-wing politicians, when
elected, often fail to live up to the expectations of their
radical supporters, especially when sweeping changes are
promised.8 Some supporters become disillusioned, but the
disappointments are infrequent enough that many put their
trust in the next great hope. In this case, and in others,
historians and political scientists can detect patterns. It is
unlikely that left-wing politicians, riding a wave of support, are trying to deceive anyone, but nonetheless many
of their supporters are probably being deceived because
their expectations are unrealistic.
Evaluate motives and incentives
In some circumstances, people have a greater incentive to
lie, and therefore others should be more sceptical of their
claims than otherwise. Someone charged with a serious
crime has a strong incentive to lie in order to avoid going
to prison. A witness to the crime, giving testimony in
court, has less reason to lie, at least if the witness is not
being bribed or threatened.
If the witness is a close friend or associate of the
defendant, then the witness has a motive to lie in support
of the defendant. On the other hand, if the witness hates
the defendant, or has been harmed by the defendant, the
witness has a motive to lie in the other direction, to help
convict the defendant. For a witness to be independent
thus is important in maintaining credibility.
8 Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969).

72

The deceptive activist

In giving testimony in court, lying is considered so
serious that it is a crime itself, called perjury. Yet it
happens all the time. Every time a defendant pleads
innocent but is found guilty, the implication is that the
defendant was lying, yet convicted criminals are almost
never charged with perjury.
More generally, a common motive for lying is that
telling the truth will cause some harm to the speaker, for
example embarrassment, loss of money or relationship
damage. Companies involved in illegal dumping of waste
are not likely to announce this to the world. Those
involved know that revealing the truth will cost the
company money, harm the company’s reputation, and
maybe lead to the loss of their jobs. Criminal prosecution
might even be possible.
When talking about the motive for a company to tell
lies, there’s an important qualification: a company is not
an individual, and it can be misleading to say that a
company has a motive, because a company does not have
a mind.9 People involved with the company can have
different motives. Many employees may not know the
truth about the illegal dumping; they do not lie, and have
no motive to do so. Indeed, top managers might not know
about the dumping. Those who know about it are parties to
a deception, and have a strong motive to tell falsehoods
about it or at least keep quiet about it. Then there are false
9 On the attribution of minds to others, including organisations,
see Daniel M. Wegner and Kurt Gray, The Mind Club: Who
Thinks, What Feels, and Why It Matters (New York: Viking,
2016).
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or misleading public statements on behalf of the company,
put out by spokespeople, perhaps advised by a public
relations firm. The people who write the public
statements, put them out and answer questions may or
may not know the statements are false or misleading.
Inside the company, there can be various levels of understanding, misunderstanding, justification, deception and
self-deception, depending on each employee’s knowledge,
role and psychology.
When outsiders attribute a motive to a company, this
is a convenient shorthand for referring to the motives of
those most responsible for decisions and/or for public
statements. To say the company has a motive to cover up
the illegal dumping captures a key psychological and
organisational dynamic, but it useful to remember that
things inside the company are far more complex. Indeed, it
is helpful to remember that any organisation is made up of
individuals, so for some purposes it can be misleading to
think of the organisation as if it is a person.
Motives are closely connected to incentives. If someone is paying you to keep quiet, the money is an incentive
and your motive is financial, at least partly so. Therefore,
looking at incentives can be useful for assessing whether
someone might be lying. The stronger the incentives to lie,
then in most cases the more likely lying will occur.
Consider the situation of lawyers who work in an
adversarial legal system such as in the US. In a criminal
trial, normally the plaintiff and the defendant are represented by lawyers. In quite a few cases, lawyers know or
have a good idea about who is really guilty or innocent.
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Nevertheless, it is their role, sometimes very well paid, to
argue on behalf of their client.
Many lawyers do whatever they can to help their
clients win, for example hammering points of attack,
hiding or not alluding to information damaging to their
client, objecting to certain questions by the opponent’s
lawyer, and so forth. In making the best possible case for
their clients, most lawyers are being deceptive at some
level. After all, their task is partisan, not a neutral quest
for the truth. That is supposed to be the role for the judge
or jury.
Every role in society contains incentives for some
types of truth-telling and some types of deception. Many
people think that being a scientist is the perfect role for
truth-telling. After all, scientific fraud — manufacturing or
altering data — is rightly condemned. Nevertheless,
looking more closely, there are incentives within the
scientific enterprise that encourage certain types of
deception.
Some scientists are employed by companies to undertake research about the company’s own products. For
example, a pharmaceutical company scientist might test a
new drug for safety and efficacy. When studying a drug
that shows great promise for being a blockbuster, there is
an incentive to show the drug in the best possible light,
minimising reporting of adverse side effects and reporting
favourable evidence of potency. This can be done in a
variety of misleading ways, including looking for adverse
effects for a too-short time period, using sample sizes that
are too small, using protocols that exclude unwelcome
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data, and not publishing trials giving results unfavourable
to the drug.10
These influences also apply to university scientists
who are paid by a company to study the company’s drugs.
So strong is this sort of influence on reported results that it
has a special name: the funding effect. Funding is the
incentive; the motive for the scientists is to keep the
funder happy and thereby maintain jobs or research grants,
as well as to publish articles, build a reputation and gain
promotions.
So strong is the influence of funding that when
seeking to detect deception, it is useful to remember the
dictum, “Follow the money.” Knowing the source of
someone’s income and wealth can do a lot to guide
assessments of the likelihood of deception. But it is only a
likelihood, not a guarantee. There are plenty of pharmaceutical company scientists who do their best to be honest,
and some companies set high ethical standards. The
funding effect can still occur, because bias can be unconscious. It is also possible that researchers and companies
with an incentive to be biased nonetheless produce
exemplary work. The point about the funding effect, and
more generally about evaluating incentives and motives, is
to pay extra attention to the possibility of deception when
there are incentives to be biased and to lie. Incentives can
be influential but they also can be ignored or resisted.

10 Ben Goldacre, Bad Pharma: How Drug Companies Mislead
Doctors and Harm Patients (London: Fourth Estate, 2012).

76

The deceptive activist

Summary
When detecting deception it can be very useful to assess
the speaker by taking notice of behavioural clues,
assessing the track record of the speaker, and evaluating
incentives and motives. These methods can offer signals
about the likelihood of deception, but they do not prove
either truth-telling or lying. What they can do is provide a
guess, sometimes a good guess, about what is going on.
Do you presume honesty and need good evidence for
lying, or do you presume deception and need good
evidence for honesty? In other words, where does the onus
of proof lie? Either way, you need evidence.
The evidence
Evidence is crucial in detecting deception. The complication is that evidence can be high or low quality, and
sometimes is misleading. Occasionally evidence is designed to be misleading.
An everyday example: your friend Peta says she can’t
come to your group’s meeting this evening because she
has a headache. Just after the end of the meeting, you
receive a message from a different friend who saw Peta
out partying. If Peta was lying about her headache as a
reason not to attend the meeting, it’s not a serious lie,
unless her presence at the meeting was absolutely crucial,
and she had promised repeatedly that she would attend no
matter what.
However, the evidence that Peta was lying is pretty
thin. The person who told you Peta was out partying might
have mistaken someone else for Peta, or might have been
lying in order to alienate you from Peta. It’s also possible
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that Peta did have a serious headache, but it lifted later in
the evening, after the meeting was over, and she felt so
much better that she went partying.
The lesson here is that it’s worthwhile determining
the quality of the evidence and thinking of possible
alternative explanations for it.
When the evidence is weak, an obvious step is to
obtain better evidence. So, after the meeting, you visit
Peta’s home to see how she’s feeling and tell her what
happened. If she’s there, and seems miserable, you have
evidence to counter the gossip that she was out partying. If
she’s not there, it’s more suspicious evidence but still not
enough to be sure she was lying.
In many incidents such as Peta’s headache, it’s not
possible to reach a definitive conclusion. The logical thing
is to suspend judgement and seek stronger evidence on
some future occasion. However, many people feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and prefer to reach a conclusion,
even if it is not well supported. This might be to believe
Peta and disregard the message about her partying or it
might be to assume she was lying. One of the greatest
challenges in detecting deception is to avoid drawing
premature conclusions or, in other words, to keep an open
mind about possibilities.
Detecting deception can be important for groups far
beyond the question of whether Peta had a headache. It
can protect the group and sometimes an entire campaign
from failure by determining whether a member might be
unreliable at a crucial time. The group needs strategies to
keep its efforts going.
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Some liars are quite skilled at twisting and changing
their stories, weaving elaborate excuses and avoiding
getting pinned down. If you regularly interact with Fred,
who you suspect is a serial liar, it can be useful to get
Fred’s statements in writing, or to make recordings of
conversations with him. Then when Fred contradicts
himself later, you have evidence. Whether to confront
Fred with the evidence is another matter. You may decide
just to keep the information to yourself, in case you need
it, for example to convince someone else. Or you might
ask Fred about the discrepancy. He might explain away
contradictions as mistakes or jokes or not really meaning
what he said.
People in the public eye, whose speeches and
informal comments are recorded, provide a rich lode of
evidence for detecting deception. Politicians frequently
give talks and interviews, and can be readily caught out in
contradictions, especially if opponents are monitoring
everything they say. It is no surprise that many politicians
develop a way of responding to questions that avoids
saying too many things directly.
A case of false credentials
In 1991, a man named John McNicol set up Whistleblowers Anonymous, the first whistleblowers organisation in
Australia. I was on the mailing list for the group’s newsletter and met with McNicol during a visit to Canberra,
where he lived.
In 1993, John was the lead organiser of a one-day
conference in Canberra put on by Whistleblowers
Anonymous. Isla MacGregor and I had set up Dissent
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Network Australia and, liaising with McNicol, organised a
workshop for the day before the conference.
On the day of the conference, everyone involved was
startled to read an article in the Canberra Times, the
respected daily newspaper for the country’s capital city,
titled “Campaigner coy at the sound of the whistle.”11 The
article, by journalist Norman Abjorensen, exposed
McNicol for having claimed credentials he did not have.
Here is an extract from Abjorensen’s article:
In an occasional paper circulated to journalists on whistleblower
protection legislation, Mr McNicol listed after his name the letters
BD, FSA (Scot), MIPRA, JP.
Asked about the BD (Bachelor of Divinity), Mr McNicol replied
that it was from “an American university,” and he volunteered that he
had been a Baptist minister at Wimbledon in London.
When asked to name the university from which he had
obtained his degree, Mr McNicol declined. Asked why he had
previously indicated it was conferred by the University of London, Mr
McNicol said he had never made this claim.
However, in a directory entitled Who’s Who in Australia and
the Far East published in 1989, Mr McNicol is listed, described as a
journalist and public relations consultant. Under education is the
entry: “Wick Academy; BD, London University, England.”
An earlier publication, Who’s Who in the Commonwealth, in
which Mr McNicol is described as a journalist and publisher, lists
under education: “Wick Academy, Scotland; London University.”
According to a letter from the International Biographical
Centre, compiler of the directories, the information was supplied by
Mr McNicol.
Further, a letter from the University of London, dated November 1992, and signed by Miss U. Garmann, of the university’s
support services and student records, examinations division, says,
“On the information given I have been unable to find any record in

11 Norman Abjorensen, “Campaigner coy at the sound of the
whistle,” Canberra Times, 27 March 1993, p. 3.
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the name of John McNicol and so, cannot verify the award to him of
a Bachelor of Divinity from the University of London.” …
[McNicol] said the questions being put to him were “improper
… as far as my credentials are concerned, I’ve got nothing to hide.”

The national director of Whistleblowers Anonymous,
John McNicol, at yesterday’s press conference.

Abjorensen undertook two tasks: detecting and exposing
deception, in this case false claims about credentials.
There were two elements to task 1, detection: establishing
that McNicol had made a claim and finding evidence that
the claim was false. Both of these are essential, because
people under scrutiny often change their story. McNicol
claimed he had never said he had a degree from the
University of London, but Abjorensen had laid a trap,
finding an entry in Who’s Who in the Commonwealth for
McNicol listing a degree from the University of London.
Anticipating that McNicol might say that the information
in the entry hadn’t come from him — namely that someone else was responsible — Abjorensen obtained a letter
from the International Biographical Centre stating that
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McNicol had supplied the information.12 What we see in
Abjorensen’s article is a careful process of pinning down
McNicol in a lie, namely claiming credentials he did not
have, and closing off escape routes that he might take.
Abjorensen’s second task was exposing deception.
McNicol was caught out in the worst possible manner, his
lies exposed in a major daily newspaper on the day of a
conference on whistleblowing he had organised. Those of
us involved in organising the conference saw this as
damaging to the credibility of whistleblowing. It would
have been far better if we had known about McNicol’s
claims beforehand, though what we might have done is
uncertain. Generally, if you are likely to be caught out in a
lie, as McNicol was, it is better to make a full admission
and apology.
However, we had no inkling about Abjorensen’s
allegations; McNicol was a rather elusive character. As it
turned out, at a committee meeting the day after the
conference, Whistleblowers Anonymous changed its name
to Whistleblowers Australia and Jean Lennane was elected
president. McNicol faded from the whistleblowing scene
and was not involved thereafter. So perhaps Abjorensen
did the group a favour, helping push out McNicol and

12 Various Who’s Who volumes at the time contacted all sorts of
people inviting them to supply information for an entry about
themselves. The companies made money by selling the resulting
volumes, at a high price, mostly to people listed in them. An entry
in such volumes provided no independent evidence of the
eminence of individuals with entries.
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enabling a more inclusive and honest group to take the
running henceforth.
As an example of detecting deception, this example
leaves out some details. We don’t know why Abjorensen
initially suspected McNicol was not everything he claimed
to be, nor why he set out to expose him at a crucial
moment. Even so, Abjorensen’s techniques, which can be
inferred from his article, reveal the importance of obtaining documentation and authoritative support to show
deception, and of thinking about possible escape routes —
ways that the deceiver might argue their way out of a hole
— and closing them off in advance.
A case of corruption — and lying
Corruption refers to activities such as fraud, bribery,
providing special favours, and a host of other things that
contravene the principles of fairness and honest operations. When speaking of corruption, most commonly
people think of governments, but corruption can occur in
any organisation, including corporations, churches, trade
unions and charities.
Corruption nearly always involves deception at some
level, to hide the unfairness from observers. In some
countries, when you are stopped by traffic police, you are
expected to offer a bribe to go on your way: corruption is
institutionalised, so it becomes standard practice, though
technically it is against the law, otherwise it shouldn’t be
called a bribe. But if you refuse to pay the bribe and
contest the matter in court, then various overt deceptions
would come to the fore.
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In the Australian state of New South Wales, there is
an organisation called the Independent Commission
Against Corruption or ICAC. It is funded by the state
government but, as its name suggests, it is independent of
the government. ICAC solicits information about corruption in public administration — it does not investigate
corruption in the private sector — and has extraordinary
powers to collect information and compel witnesses to
testify. On the other hand, it cannot prosecute individuals
that it finds corrupt: that task is referred to police and the
courts.
In one of its investigations, ICAC targeted activities
in Wollongong City Council, the local government body
covering most of the city of Wollongong.13 The council
includes a dozen elected officials called councillors and a
government bureaucracy with numerous employees dealing with local concerns.
Exactly why ICAC decided to investigate Wollongong Council is not public knowledge, but certainly it
received tip-offs from individuals that some improper
dealings were occurring. This would not be surprising,
because corruption in Australian local government bodies
is commonplace. Many of the elected councillors are
property developers who use their positions to influence,
directly or indirectly, decisions made about local devel13 In this account, I draw on “Corruption tactics: outrage
management in a local government scandal,” Resistance Studies
Magazine, 2012, http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/12rsm.html, which
provides a detailed analysis. The paragraphs referring to Frank
Vellar are taken directly from this article.
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opment. For example, if an area of land is rezoned from
residential to commercial, this provides a windfall profit to
the owner of the land. If anyone knows in advance about
the rezoning, they can buy the land and benefit financially.
Alternatively, the decision about which areas to rezone
can be influenced by the current owners, who might bribe
council staff who make the decisions. The same sort of
thing can occur with approvals for buildings and other
developments.
This sort of corruption thrives on secrecy and lying.
No one publicly admits that rules are being broken.
Corruption can occur under the noses of other staff, and
often only a few individuals know about special deals.
One or more individuals reported their suspicions or
evidence of corruption to ICAC, and ICAC decided to
investigate further. The investigators tapped the telephones of key people in the council, including councillors
and staff. After collecting quite a bit of evidence from
these telephone taps, ICAC carried out a raid on the
council building, confiscating paper files and computers
and searching the contents for additional evidence.
Until the raid, which was public, ICAC’s investigation was secret: ICAC used its own confidential processes
to collect information, first from those who reported their
suspicions and then in setting up the telephone taps. After
the raid, ICAC took several months to analyse the information it had collected, and then ran public hearings in
which witnesses were compelled to attend and answer
questions. If they refused, they could be charged under the
ICAC Act, with criminal penalties probably worse than
what would happen to them otherwise.
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At the public hearings, various people were put on
the stand and asked to answer questions. The questions
were usually put by Noel Hemmings, senior counsel for
ICAC, and occasionally by the Commissioner himself.
Some of the people questioned were the ones suspected of
corruption; others were called as credible witnesses or
experts concerning the matters addressed. The questioning
of the individuals suspected of corruption was revealing.
Hemmings prepared the ground well, seeking to pin down
the individual on the stand in a lie, by obtaining admissions to close off loopholes, namely ways they could
explain away evidence. Then the witness would be
confronted with a recording, played immediately after
their statements, of their own conversations — obtained
through telephone taps — that showed that they were
lying. Or so it seemed to nearly everyone in the room.
Despite seemingly irrefutable evidence of lying, nearly
everyone who testified refused to admit it, and gave some
other explanation. This could be considered a continuation
of the lying, or just as a reluctance to admit to lying.
Frank Vellar, a property developer, denied asking for
approval of his development application via planner John
Gilbert. In the ICAC hearings, Hemmings, asked Vellar
“Had you asked Mr Gilbert to have his computer used to
record the consent so that Ms Morgan’s name would not
appear on it?” Vellar answered “No, I did not.” Hemmings, to limit Vellar’s room to manoeuvre, asked “Did
you have a conversation on that line?” Vellar: “No I did
not.”
At this point a recording was played of a conversation between Gilbert, Morgan and Vellar. Hemmings then
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asked, “I asked you questions as to whether you had made
any application to Mr Gilbert or Mr Oxley that the
application be signed by him and not Ms Morgan. Do you
recall that?” Vellar: “Yes.” Hemmings: “And you denied
it?” Vellar: “Because I did not recollect what you had
asked me.” Hemmings: “You didn’t recollect?” Vellar:
“You had asked me, I believe a question that I did not
understand correctly. By playing the tape I have heard
now what you were asking me.” Vellar thus avoided
admitting to a lie.
The experience at the ICAC hearings reveals, in a
stark fashion, people’s reluctance to admit to lying. The
implication is that you may be able to find good evidence
that someone is lying, but getting them to accept it can be
much more difficult. If your aim is to force an admission
or, more realistically, to make the lying obvious to others,
then you need evidence that is detailed and specific. You
need to be prepared for face-saving explanations such as
“That’s not what I meant” or “I was just making a joke” or
“That wasn’t me” or “That’s taken out of context” or — as
in the case of Frank Vellar — “I didn’t understand.” At
the ICAC hearings, witnesses were compelled to answer
questions. In most other situations, people can avoid
admitting to lying by simply refusing to comment,
changing the topic or by counter-attacking, for example
accusing you of lying or of bullying.
More on the evidence
For detecting deception, it is crucial to collect and
evaluate evidence. Evidence on its own is not sufficient,
because the evidence might be wrong, intentionally
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misleading, poor quality or not relevant. Collecting and
evaluating evidence sometimes can be quick and easy,
such as watching for when someone leaves a house, or can
be lengthy and elaborate, equivalent to a major research
project. Evidence can be used to clarify key concepts,
expose contradictions and conflicting claims, to verify
facts and to reassess assumptions.
One useful check is to ask whether evidence from the
same source has previously been reliable. Suppose one of
the members of your group is in touch with an informant
in the government and is telling you about plans for
policy, including attempts to hide information the public
will not like and to offer misleading arguments for policies
that will serve special interests. On six previous occasions,
the informant’s information has proved accurate. This
gives you some assurance that the next bit of inside
information will be accurate too, though it’s not a guarantee. It’s possible the informant might have been setting
you up with accurate information in order to mislead you
on something important, or that government officials have
identified the informant and are now feeding the informant
misleading information.
The Big Short
The global financial crisis provides a rich source of
examples about detecting deception. Many individuals and
groups in the financial sector were involved in fraudulent
or misleading activities. In the US, the heart of the crisis,
agents in the home loan sector provided loans to individuals who had no prospect of ever paying them back. Some
of these so-called subprime home loans went to people
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with no jobs and no income. These people were sold on a
false hope of home ownership and not informed they
would lose a lot of money a few years later, as well as
become homeless.
Who would want to invest in a subprime mortgage?
To make such loans seem attractive to investors, several
mortgages were bundled together. Some of the mortgages
were considered extremely likely to be repaid: these were
called AAA. Others were less reliable, called AA, A,
BBB, BB and B. The B types were subprime loans. The
deception in bundling mortgages was to label the package
of loans according to the best ones. A bundle that was half
in the B category would still be labelled AAA and sold to
institutional investors as highly secure. They would better
be called “junk bonds,” meaning they had little or no
value.
Then there were bundles of subprime mortgages.
These were called collateral debt obligations or CDOs and
sold as if they were worth something. When loan defaults
started snowballing in 2007, banks were caught holding
billions of dollars worth of junk bonds. Those who knew
the risk quickly sold (unloaded) these bonds — soon to
become worthless — to naïve investors. It was another
deception.
Then there were the rating agencies, most prominently Moody’s and Standard & Poor. To maintain their
business with the banks, they gave false ratings on junk
bonds. This was a gross deception, equivalent to a sports
referee saying a team had scored when actually they had
lost the ball midfield.
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Michael Lewis undertakes investigative work and
writes stories that read like novels. He has taken a special
interest in financial operations. One of his books, The Big
Short — later made into an award-winning movie — is
about individuals in the financial scene who figured out
that the US home-loan sector was going to melt down due
to all the subprime mortgages.14 The methods used by
these operators illustrate different ways of detecting
deception. One qualification is necessary: in much of the
financial sector, ignorance and short-sighted self-interest
rather than deception can explain much of the behaviour
that led to the crisis.
Michael Burry, a stock market investor, was acclaimed for his astute understanding of markets. He had an
eye for numbers while remaining independent of public
opinion. He scanned through prospectuses of subprime
mortgage bonds and came to the conclusion that the
housing mortgage market would begin to collapse in early
2007, when variable mortgage rates would become much
greater, causing owners to default on their loans. Seeking
to take advantage of this knowledge, he entered into
mortgage swaps with banks, essentially betting that the
housing boom would go bust, eventually putting over a
billion dollars into this bet. Given that housing bonds were
widely seen as the most stable of investments, the companies he approached for the swaps thought they were
getting something for nothing at Burry’s expense.
14 Michael Lewis, The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
(Penguin, 2011).
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A hedge fund manager, Steve Eisman, was sceptical
of the investing orthodoxy. He started focusing on the
lenders and borrowers. To check what was happening, his
partners visited new housing estates in Miami. These were
huge houses costing far more than the usual US home, yet
the owners had little income. Through interviews with
lenders, Eisman’s partners discovered that no one was
being refused a loan, no matter how lacking in jobs or
income.
Vinny and Danny [Eisman’s partners] flew down to
Miami, where they wandered around empty neighborhoods built with subprime loans, and saw with
their own eyes how bad things were. “They’d call me
and say, ‘Oh my God, this is a calamity here’,”
recalls Eisman.15
Then there were two young investors, Charlie Ledley
and Jamie Mai, who in a matter of four years had turned
$100,000 into $30 million by a simple approach: they took
into account highly unlikely events that other investors did
not want to think about. They chanced on information that
the property market was going to collapse. In order to
make major investments (bets), they needed access to the
exchanges run by the large firms, but discovered that the
minimum funds for sitting at the table were $1.5 billion.
So they turned to a former trader they knew who enabled
them to make huge bets on a market collapse.
15 Ibid., p. 96.
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These stories of investment analysts who anticipated
the global financial crisis show several ways of detecting
deception. Burry used his extraordinary capacity to see
patterns in rows of numbers. Eisman investigated the
housing market by having his staff talk to new homeowners and the lenders who had enabled them to buy houses.
Ledley and Mai did it by following the example of others,
using their intuition.16
Burry, Eisner, Ledley and Mai were exceptions. Most
investors did not anticipate a collapse. Many were simply
ignorant: they did not understand what was going on.
However, many of them knew about the shaky foundations of bundled mortgages and junk bonds. It might be
said they were subject to self-deception. There had not
been a housing market collapse for decades, so it seemed
impossible and the prospect was simply ignored or dismissed. This is especially easy when everyone else is
proceeding as if there was no problem.
Self-deception is one of the greatest barriers to
detecting deception by others. What it often means in
practice is not searching for contrary evidence. This is
well known in psychology and is called confirmation bias:
people with a strong commitment to a point of view are
more likely to notice evidence supporting their view and
to ignore or contest contrary evidence. There is even a
phenomenon, called backfire, in which exposure to
contrary evidence can reinforce people’s original views: in
16 The story is more complex than indicated by these vignettes,
and other players were involved. See Lewis’s book for more
information.
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contesting the challenging evidence, their original views
are reaffirmed.17
Conclusion
To detect deception, there are three main approaches:
assess the speaker, uncover and analyse the evidence, and
assess the history and context. What methods to use
depends a lot on the circumstances. Collecting and examining the evidence is usually crucial. Doing this in a fair
fashion is hard for many people. A common problem is
assuming that others are lying because they say things
with which you disagree or think are plain wrong.
However, there might be other explanations, for example
that they believe what they are saying or that there is some
truth in what they are trying to express.
On the other hand, some individuals regularly lie and
some governments and corporations are involved in
operations that involve serious ongoing deception. Studying historical examples and patterns of collusion can help
in deciding whether something shady is going on.
It is important to remain aware of the possibility of
self-deception, by others and yourself. Self-deception
combined with people’s tendency to follow the crowd can
lead to collective illusions. Furthermore, experts may be
just as susceptible to self-deception as anyone else, so
17 Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler, “When corrections fail: the
persistence of political misperceptions,” Political Behavior, Vol.
32, No. 2, 2010, pp. 303–330. This is different from my own
concept of backfire that can result when people are outraged by
an injustice.
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deferring to someone who is confident and seems
knowledgeable can be risky.
Detecting deception is one thing. What to do about it
is another. If you’ve just caught your close friend in a lie
— he said he was at a work meeting but actually was
having drinks at a bar — confronting him with it might
wreck your relationship, and you need to consider whether
confronting the lie is worth jeopardising everything you
share. If you demand complete truth from everyone you
know, you may not end up with any friends at all!
Perhaps, sometimes, it is better not to know.

Graphic adapted from http://www.wikihow.com/Care-for-a-Sick-Dog

5
Ethics and lying
Key points
• A prohibition on lying has some harmful consequences.
• More useful is seeing truth-telling as one virtue among
others.
• One way to help decide when deception is warranted is
to look at the criteria for effective nonviolent action.
Is lying good or bad? More generally, is deceiving people
good or bad? There are several possible answers. One is
that lying is always bad and therefore should be avoided at
all costs. A second is that lying is usually bad and should
be avoided except in exceptional circumstances. A third
answer is that it depends on the circumstances.
The absolutist position, namely that lying is always
bad, was endorsed by famous philosopher Immanuel Kant
(1724–1804) via his idea of the categorical imperative.
Kant said we should look at the implications if everyone
lied all the time. The result would be a totally dysfunctional society, because no one could trust what anyone
said. Therefore, according to Kant, it is imperative to
avoid lying.
“A lie can be halfway round the world before the truth
has got its boots on.” — James Callaghan, British
politician (1976)
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The trouble with such an absolute position is that just
a few exceptions undermine the rule. The classic example
is when Nazis come to the door of your house and ask
whether there are any Jews inside. You know the Nazis
will kill the Jews you are harbouring, so you lie and say
no. It might be wrong to lie, but in this instance it prevents
a far greater wrong, killing of innocent people.
This example and others like it lead to the second
answer to the question “Is lying good or bad?,” namely
that it usually bad and should be avoided or discouraged
when possible. Ethicist Sissela Bok, in her widely cited
book Lying,1 says most lying is undesirable and that it
would be worthwhile to implement policies and promote
practices that reduce the need to lie, for example when
defending a client in court or when writing a letter of
recommendation if telling the full truth sinks an applicant’s chances.
Mohandas Gandhi held the view that lying should be
avoided whenever possible. Gandhi characterised his
approach to social engagement — which involved challenging systems of oppression — as a search for the truth.
One aspect of this search was complete honesty. In
mounting campaigns against British rule in India, Gandhi
always began by writing to his opponent spelling out his
concerns and requests and saying what he and others
would do should his requests not be met. For example,
prior to the famous 1930 salt march challenging the
British salt laws, Gandhi wrote an open letter to Lord
1 Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life
(Hassocks: Harvester, 1978).
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Edward Irwin, the Viceroy, seeking a resolution and
stating his plans.
Gandhi and his supporters knew that polite letters
would not bring about significant changes in British
policy, and probably not even minor concessions. The key
point here is Gandhi’s modelling of appropriate behaviour,
which in his mind was part of a search for truth. He did
not claim to know what was best but instead sought a
dialogue from which truth was more likely to emerge.
Gandhi tried to initiate such a dialogue by being open
about his motives, goals and plans. This can be contrasted
with activists who, seeing dialogue as pointless, organise
surprise rallies or otherwise try to mislead authorities
about who they are and what they are going to do.
Another way of understanding Gandhi’s commitment
to a search for truth is that he wanted his means to be
compatible with his ends. If the goal, or end, is a peaceful
world, then the means or methods to achieve it should also
be peaceful. This leads to Gandhi’s adherence to methods
not involving any violence against opponents.
Applied to truth-telling, the principle of making the
means reflect the ends leads to the conclusion that lies
should be avoided. The goal presumably is a world in
which everyone is committed to seeking the truth and in
which deception is avoided, so to move towards this goal
of a truthful world, every effort should be made to be
totally honest along the way.
Robert Burrowes, a prominent Australian nonviolent
activist and author of The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense,
followed Gandhi’s precepts. In his chapter “Planning and
organizing nonviolent defense,” Burrowes discusses the
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importance of nonviolent discipline — refusing to use
physical violence in response to being physically assaulted
— and recommends that activists make a pledge to a
“Code of nonviolent discipline.” He lists one particular
code or covenant, drawn from one used by Gandhi in 1930
and one used widely in Brazil.2 It has 14 points, including:
1. I will speak the truth.
2. I will endeavour to overcome my fear of punishment and death.
3. I will work conscientiously to purify my personal
life.
4. I will treat each person with honesty, openness,
caring, and respect.
Most relevant here is point #1: “I will speak the truth.” He
took this very seriously, always attempting to try to say
what he really felt.
Gandhi: too trusting?
Gandhi’s position on lying, as recommended by Burrowes,
is close to Kant’s view that lying should be avoided as a
matter of principle, at least in relation to activist-related
matters. This sounds noble, but there are many traps for an
honest individual in a world filled with deception.
The salt march, conceived and led by Gandhi, stimulated Indian popular resistance to British rule like nothing
2 Robert J. Burrowes, The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense: A
Gandhian Approach (Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press, 1996), pp. 183–184.
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before it. Participation in civil disobedience by making
salt captured the national imagination. The British imprisoned tens of thousands of Indians but could not quell the
challenge. But something else did: a promise. Lord Irwin,
in lengthy negotiations with Gandhi, agreed that independence for India would be seriously considered at a
conference in London. Gandhi, as trusting as he was truthtelling, took the British at their word, called off the salt
campaign, attended the conference and came back with
nothing.3 The promise and the conference provided only
an illusion of honest negotiation: independence was not
really on the table. Gandhi was easily fooled by the British
promises. Similarly, many activists in the years since have
been taken in by promises by politicians, corporate leaders
and others.
In the 1930s, the Japanese military invaded China.
Then after the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, Japanese
troops quickly conquered the Philippines, Singapore,
Burma and other countries in southeast Asia, and were
poised to face the British, still the rulers of India. Gandhi
opposed Japanese imperialism just as he opposed British
imperialism. He decided to write a letter to the Japanese
people, including what he admired about Japan as well as
his criticisms of Japanese war-making. What Gandhi
didn’t anticipate was the way his letter would be used to
serve the Japanese rulers.
3 Thomas Weber, On the Salt March: The Historiography of
Gandhi’s March to Dandi (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 1997), p.
462. The story is more complex than the abbreviated account
here.
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Several newspapers published Gandhi’s letter — in
an edited form, reproducing the sections praising Japan
but omitting criticisms of Japanese military expansionism.
Gandhi scholar Thomas Weber explains what happened:
Regardless of context, those parts of the letter which
were beneficial to Japanese policy were published on
the front page of the Yomiuri on 18 September 1942
under the heading “An Open Letter to Japan from
Gandhi.” Rather conveniently, it left out all sections
critical of Japanese imperialism. The letter as published in Yomiuri is a flagrant example of misinformation. The article ended up reproducing only a
carefully selected fraction of Gandhi’s original letter
and included sentences which did not appear in
Gandhi’s original at all. […]
In short, Gandhi’s actual message did not reach
the people of Japan. At this stage in his life, Gandhi
was one of the most famous people on the planet. He
was widely respected but there was no internet and
the Japanese people were generally monolingual.
Their information came from the Japanese press.
Here they were told that Gandhi more or less supported the imperialism of Japan while he detested the
imperialism of the British. With very selective quoting Gandhi was brought on side for the most unGandhian of causes.4
4 Thomas Weber, “101 uses for a dead mahatma: the co-option of
Gandhi for non-Gandhian causes,” Gandhi Marg, Vol. 37, No. 2,
July-September 2015, pp. 387–392, quote from pp. 391–392.
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This is a good example of the perils of telling the truth and
being too trusting of others. Gandhi did not anticipate how
his letter would be used by ruthless nationalists and
unscrupulous propagandists. If he had known how his
letter would be used, what should he have done according
to his principle of seeking the truth? He might decline to
write anything to the Japanese people, but this would be
withholding his views, a type of self-censorship. Or he
could have written a letter that omitted anything positive
about Japan, again engaging in self-censorship. For
Gandhi, it seems, there was no easy way to reconcile a
total avoidance of deception and preventing his words
being used to serve a goal he opposed.
Truth-telling and other virtues
Rather than adopt an absolutist prohibition on lying, an
alternative is to see truth-telling as a virtue or a value that
sometimes clashes with other desirable values, such as
protecting life, liberty or the environment. Lots of scenarios can be imagined in which a clash of values occurs.
A man, who is known to have beaten his wife on
numerous occasions, arrives looking for her. He is armed
and extremely angry. Which value is your priority? To tell
the truth that she is inside the house, or to protect her
safety by lying?
A government security official detains you and
demands the password to your online files where you have
the names and contact details of activists. You know that
revealing the names will make them vulnerable to arrest or
surveillance. Do you provide the password? Or do you
deceive the security official by giving a different password
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that gives access to a version of your online files without
the names and contact details? In this case, not only did
you deceive the official: you made advance plans for lying
in this very situation.
Imagine that you work in public relations for a
company, and you are asked to write a statement that
covers up responsibility for a faulty product that led to the
deaths of many consumers. If you write the statement, you
are implicated in a falsehood. If you refuse, you may lose
your job. Another option is to write the statement and then
leak information about the faulty product and the company’s responsibility to the media or action groups. Leaking involves lying (to your bosses), yet it can be the most
effective way of getting the truth to outside audiences.
When telling the truth is treated as one value among
several, and lying is treated as sometimes the right thing to
do, it may seem like principles of right and wrong have
flown out the window. Morality becomes dependent on
circumstances. When choosing what to do, lots of things
need to be considered, including the people, the circumstances and the likely consequences, including your credibility as a truth-teller.
Although saying that truth-telling is contingent on
circumstances might seem to be a rejection of morality, it
can also be considered to be the basis for a superior
morality, one that takes into account the realities associated with deception. An absolutist position that lying is
always wrong is actually a form of deception itself,
because too often it is violated (covertly or otherwise) and
leads to damaging consequences. For achieving a better
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world, a relativist position, sensitive to people and circumstances, has better prospects.
People can ask themselves questions about what is
the best course of action, and examine their own behaviour to come up with principles that apply in particular
circumstances. When is it wise to lie to authorities? In an
action group, is it ever beneficial to lie to others in the
group? If a member of the group has done something
wrong, is it better to be open about it now or to keep it
hidden in the hope that outsiders will never know? What
about deceptions you know about occurring in other
groups, on your side? What are the pros and cons of infiltrating opposition groups to collect information about
harmful activities? Should we use encryption in our
communications? Should we invite police to our planning
meetings? Should we wear masks at rallies?5
Then there are questions about whether to reveal
personal feelings and thoughts. Should I tell others that
I’m afraid to join an action, or pretend that I’m confident?
If I think the cause is hopeless, should I say so, say
nothing, or join in the chorus of optimism? If I think
someone might be an infiltrator, should I say this in the
group, say it to a close friend, or keep quiet and collect
more information?
These and other questions raise a host of delicate
issues about trust, relationships, tactics and principles.
Discussing such questions is worthwhile in clarifying
people’s ideas and coordinating plans. Strangely enough,
discussing when to lie can be a process for building trust,
5 Several of these scenarios are discussed in the next chapter.
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a trust based on a common understanding of when
deception is a worthwhile option, and a trust based on
understanding of differences in views about honesty and
deception. Of course, any discussion of lying itself is
subject to the possibility of participants being deceptive
and subject to self-deception, making the complexities
greater. This might be frustrating but is likely to be more
useful than the illusion of always telling the truth.
Lying, the nonviolent way
Another way to assess deception is to look at the characteristics of nonviolent action — such as rallies, vigils,
strikes, boycotts and sit-ins — and see whether they apply
to particular instances or types of lying. Elsewhere I
selected seven features of effective nonviolent action that
might be transported to arenas where there is no physical
violence, such as being defamed or engaging in the debate
over euthanasia.6 The seven features are nonstandard,
limited harm, participation, voluntary participation, fairness, prefiguration and skilful use. It may seem strange to
see whether lying can be analogous to nonviolent action,
or be part of nonviolent action, but it is worthwhile
looking at what this means in practice.
Standard or authorised methods of political action in
countries where civil liberties are respected include
writing to politicians, advertising, public meetings, elec6 Brian Martin, Nonviolence Unbound (Sparsnäs, Sweden: Irene
Publishing, 2015). One of my case studies was verbal defence,
but this involved defending against verbal abuse, without
particular attention to lying.
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tion campaigning and voting. Nonviolent action is defined
as being different from such standard methods while not
involving physical violence against opponents. So when is
deception standard and nonstandard? It is standard in
social conventions such as responding “Fine” to the casual
enquiry “How are you today?” and in the convention in
media reporting to not mention that journalists have been
fed material for stories from governments, corporations,
special interest groups and other “newsmakers.” For
deception to qualify as non-standard, it needs to be
unusual or provocative. An example is the comedy team
the Yes Men, who set up fake websites, impersonate
corporate executives, arrange stunts and otherwise use
deception and humour to challenge powerful groups.7 In
one stunt in 2015, Edward Snowden unexpectedly
appeared at the Los Angeles Convention Center, having
just been pardoned by the President, to huge applause
from the capacity crowd — except that it was an actor and
Snowden hadn’t been pardoned; Snowden then spoke
from Russia via a live video link.
The second feature of effective nonviolent action is
limited harm, namely not causing serious pain, suffering
or physical harm to anyone involved. This feature is
central to the classic example of lying to the Nazis. If
lying reduces or prevents harm, it is easier to justify. Lies
that cause unnecessary harm are not effective tools in a
campaign that benefits the world.
The third feature is participation: the more people
who can join a nonviolent action, the more likely it is to be
7 See the Yes Lab, http://yeslab.org/.
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effective. Just about anyone can participate in a rally,
strike or boycott, but very few are able or willing to perch
on top of a tripod or hang a banner from the side of a
building. Rallies, strikes and boycotts feature prominently
in mass campaigns against repressive regimes. In line with
this feature, lies in which lots of people can participate are
more likely to be effective as part of a campaign based on
nonviolence principles. Groups of activists, when arrested,
might all give their name as Mohandas Gandhi. If there is
a ban on wearing the hijab, many women might wear it as
a form of protest, even though they are not Muslims.
However, according to the fourth feature of effective
nonviolent action, participation in deception needs to be
voluntary. This rules out police, lawyers or public relations personnel lying to the public because of government
instructions.
The fifth feature is fairness. Many observers think it
is unfair for police to beat non-resisting protesters.
However, when protesters throw bricks at police, this is
likely to be seen as unfair to the police, and justify police
counter-violence. Refraining from any physical violence is
a good way to prevent unfairness. Applying this feature to
lying requires assessing the likely response of observers.
Consider a leaker of secret government information,
someone like Daniel Ellsberg, Chelsea Manning or
Edward Snowden. They were involved in deception, at
least until their identities were exposed. The greater the
crimes and abuses they expose, the more likely their
deceptions will be seen as fair. Of course not everyone
thinks the same way about leaking secret documents or
any other action, so assessing this criterion requires
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determining or anticipating the reactions of a range of
observers.
The sixth feature is prefiguration, which occurs when
the means reflect the ends. If the goal is a world without
organised violence, then nonviolent action is prefigurative
whereas armed struggle is not. If the goal is a world of
total honesty, then lying will never be prefigurative.
However, as discussed before, it can be argued that a
world of total honesty would be intolerable for most
people, and hence not a desirable goal. If, instead, the goal
is a world without malign lies that serve oppressive
systems, then prefiguration is much easier: it just means
restricting lies to those that help challenge oppressive
systems.
However, there is an extra complication here. In
advance, it can be difficult to know when a lie will help
challenge an oppressive system: the lie might turn out to
be counterproductive, and then it is too late to undo it.
The seventh and final feature of effective nonviolent
action is skilful use. Rallies, strikes, boycotts and other
such methods need to be well organised and carried out by
people with suitable understanding, capacities and experience. This may involve training. Just as soldiers need
training to be effective, so do nonviolent activists. The
implication for lying on behalf of a worthy cause is that if
you’re going to do it, do it well. An unconvincing lie can
be worse than telling a damaging truth.
The seven features of effective nonviolent action canvassed here — nonstandard, limited harm, participation,
voluntary participation, fairness, prefiguration and skilful
use — are not automatically relevant to lying or deception.
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To see their relevance is a matter of applying them to
particular cases and seeing whether they help in offering
insights or making judgements about appropriateness.
There is a reasonable prospect that they are likely to offer
some useful guidance, without forming a rigid prescription
about when and how to be deceptive. This is because
nonviolent action, in its traditional areas of application —
strikes, rallies, boycotts and the like — is based on
principles of dignity and equality.8
A key aspect of the ethics of nonviolent action is not
causing physical harm to others. A strike or boycott can
cause economic harm, but the opponent’s physical integrity is respected. Nonviolent action keeps open the possibility of dialogue. Indeed, one of the key functions of
nonviolent action is to create the conditions for dialogue.
The seven features of effective nonviolent action capture
some of the ethical character of this approach to conflict.
Therefore, applying these seven features elsewhere may
include implicit ethical considerations, and this may also
apply to lying.
To summarise: Kant’s approach, using the categorical
imperative, treats lying as always bad. A modified version
of this approach treats lying as an evil to be adopted only
when it serves to prevent a greater evil. A more pragmatic
approach treats lying as something to be used or avoided
depending on the circumstances. For activists who want
guidance in tune with their principles, it can be worth
8 On dignity and equality as core values of nonviolence, see Todd
May, Nonviolent Resistance: A Philosophical Introduction
(Cambridge: Polity, 2015).
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looking at the seven features of effective nonviolent action
and seeing how they apply to issues involving deception.
In the next chapter, these approaches will be applied to
some typical scenarios.

Images from http://www.vectorfree.com/modern-businessman-vectors;
Dialogue adapted from a cartoon in The Australian Media, 27 September
2001, p. 2

6
Case studies
Key points
• Case studies of deception in activism are useful for
clarifying values and strategies.
• Several criteria can be used to judge deception in
activism, including participation, prefiguration, possible
harm and fairness-related impacts.
• In deciding whether to use deception, no single criterion
or answer will apply in all circumstances.
To better judge when activists might use deception —
with each other, in relation to opponents or the public —
it’s useful to examine sample activities or situations. I
present several here, with comments about considerations
to take into account concerning deception. At the end of
the chapter, I look at each of the activities from several
viewpoints. There is no single answer about whether
deception should be avoided, ignored or embraced. It is
important to be aware of the issues.
Keeping a secret
You’re in a group campaigning for a worthy cause, for
example promoting peace, overcoming poverty or combatting racism. One of the group members, Rose, tells you
some personal information: she once became very drunk,
hit someone, was arrested and convicted of assault, and
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was sentenced to community service. She asks you to keep
this information secret. You need to weigh up confidentiality in relation to the group’s cause.
Rose’s confidential information might also have been
about sexual relationships, drug addiction, gang membership, mental illness or any of a host of other topics that
might cast her in a negative light. For the time being, let’s
assume the information does not relate to your group’s
cause. If your group is opposing racism and Rose was
previously a member of a racist group, your response
might be different.
Keeping a secret may require being deceptive. It
might be that nobody asks you anything about Rose’s past,
but still you’re not revealing something you know. Furthermore, another member, Fred, might say to you, “I
heard that Rose was convicted of assault. Do you know
anything about it?” To keep the secret means telling a
falsehood: “I haven’t heard anything like that.”
Some people are no good at keeping secrets. The first
thing they do is go and tell someone else, retelling the
story with their own interpretations, assumptions and
exaggerations. Others are cautious about who they tell:
they might tell a few close friends who are not involved
(and who don’t know Rose), trusting them not to tell
others. If you’re the sort of person who tells no one at all,
you’re unusual. Rose has good reason to trust you.
There are all sorts of complications. Consider Fred’s
question about whether Rose had been convicted of
assault. If Rose has told both of you, then it might seem
safe to talk about it. But what if Fred is bluffing? Actually,
Rose hasn’t told him anything, but he heard a rumour and
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thought he’d check it out with you. If you suspect Fred’s
claim, it would be better to talk to Rose first. Maybe she’s
talked only to you, or maybe she’s individually told a
number of people.
Another complication is that Rose may not have told
you everything. Maybe she’s playing down how serious
the incident was: actually the person she hit was seriously
disabled as a result, or she wasn’t drunk but actually
angry, or she went to prison. On the other hand, maybe
she’s exaggerating what happened — it was a minor
scuffle and she was asked to leave the club and never
arrested or convicted — to make it sound like she’s had a
rough past.
There are various factors you need to consider. If
Rose is a key figure in your group, perhaps a spokesperson, will opponents and journalists be interested in
information about her conviction for assault? Will they
use the information to discredit Rose and your group? If
so, is it better to try to hide the information, or to make it
public in your own way to reduce the impact, perhaps by
showing that she has learned from her mistakes? Should
you talk to Rose about these possibilities? Should you
raise the issue, without mentioning Rose, at a meeting?
“What should we do if opponents try to obtain dirt on any
of us in order to discredit the group and our goals?”
If you think Rose’s past is going to be a significant
vulnerability to your group, maybe you should check out
her story. You could, for example, look up court records.
Or, if you know enough, you could talk to some of the
people involved, especially the person she assaulted, and
find out what they think. If you can learn something, then
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opponents or journalists could too, presumably. But if you
start probing, perhaps Rose will hear about it and think
you’ve violated her trust. Furthermore, if you start probing, others might hear about your enquiries and start
investigating for themselves. Trying to verify Rose’s story
might make things a lot worse.
This example illustrates that absolutist positions —
never tell a lie, or always keep a confidence — are not
very helpful. There are too many complications, and a
suitable course of action depends on the personalities of
the people involved, the details of the information, the
dynamics of the group, and the possible actions by opponents, journalists and others.
What about good news? Should you ever keep that
secret? Rose has told you she’s going to receive a
prestigious award or she has a great new job or has
decided to have a child. Let’s assume, for the sake of
argument, that she thinks this is good news and you do
too, and you’re happy for her. However, Rose asks you to
keep the information secret for the time being. In fact, you
promised before she told you the news.
This might be more difficult, because what’s the
harm in people knowing something positive? Actually,
there can be harm. Rose knows about the award through a
confidential source, but it’s not official yet, and announcing the award to the world would offend the committee
members who made the decision. Rose knows about her
job offer, but her colleagues at her current job don’t, and
she wants to tell them in her own way. She has decided to
have a child but hasn’t told her partner that she’s pregnant.
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So it might be safer to say nothing about good news
you’ve been asked to keep secret. As in the case of negative information, a lot depends on the circumstances. It’s
valuable in all circumstances to think about possible
scenarios, to examine likely impacts — including whether
you maintain Rose’s trust — and act accordingly. If in
doubt, it can be useful to talk to someone who is not
involved and doesn’t know Rose and lay out the situation,
without names or details.
Leaking
Whistleblowing means speaking out in the public interest.1
A typical whistleblower is an employee who sees a problem at work — for example corruption, abuse or hazards
to the public — and reports it to someone in authority.
Most whistleblowers initially report their concerns to their
boss. If that doesn’t work, they might go to higher
management (the boss’s boss), a governing board, outside
agencies such as an ombudsman or anti-corruption body,
politicians or the media.
If managers also want the problem fixed, then whistleblowing might be welcomed. However, when the problem implicates managers, they will see the whistleblower
as the problem and initiate reprisals. These include ostracism (cutting off collegial interactions), spreading of
rumours, petty harassment (verbal abuse; requests being
ignored; inconvenient shifts being assigned), assignment
1 There is a large amount of writing about whistleblowing. For
my perspective, see Whistleblowing: A Practical Guide
(Sparsnäs, Sweden: Irene Publishing, 2013).
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to trivial duties or to duties with high demands, open
denunciations, formal reprimands, referral to psychiatrists,
demotion, dismissal and blacklisting.
This is a long list of reprisals, and the impact on the
whistleblower is often devastating, leading to financial
loss, emotional upset and adverse impacts on relationships
and health.
Whistleblowers can be ideal allies for activist groups.
Consider a group campaigning against use of a chemical.
A worker in the company producing the chemical might
have information about its health or environmental
impacts — information kept secret by the company.
Openly speaking out about problems at work has
several shortcomings. One is that as soon as you speak
out, reprisals begin. That is bad enough. As well, you will
be denied access to information. Furthermore, managers
will start a cover-up operation, hiding or destroying
information that might reveal their criminality or lack of
oversight. For this reason, it’s usually advisable for
potential whistleblowers to collect as much information as
possible before speaking out.
Another option is to leak, which can also be called
blowing the whistle anonymously. Rather than speaking
out to the boss or an ombudsman and revealing your
identity, instead you collect information and post it to a
journalist or an action group. Alternatively, you may
decide to reveal your identity to a journalist or activist,
meeting with them and telling what you know. By leaking,
you avoid reprisals and can stay on the job, collecting
more information and leaking again if needed. Indeed, you
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can continue to be a leaker for months or years — unless
you are discovered.
Being a leaker involves deception. You collect information and send it to a journalist or an activist, but you
say nothing to your boss or colleagues. (You might
confide with a few trusted friends and family members,
but this is risky. They might not be able to keep a secret.)
If your leak has an impact, there will be a news report
based on it, or perhaps a message that there will be an
official investigation of your unit.
If you’re careful, you will have ensured that nothing
you’ve leaked can identify you directly. You’ve converted
word-processed documents to text files so the revealing
“properties” of the documents disappear. If you’ve written
an explanation of the documents, you’ve disguised your
writing style. You’ve destroyed the stand-alone device
you used to write it and used a short-term email account to
send it. In these and other ways, you’ve hidden or
disguised your actions.2 From your point of view, you’re
being careful. Others may see you as being devious.
No matter how careful you are, there is a risk that a
thorough investigation will identify you as a possible
leaker. You may need to lie convincingly to an investigator, saying you don’t know who the leaker might be, and
perhaps providing some cover story for some of your

2 Brian Martin, “Leaking: practicalities and politics,” The Whistle
(Newsletter of Whistleblowers Australia), #81, January 2015, pp.
13–16, http://www.bmartin.cc/dissent/contacts/au_wba/whistle20
1501.pdf.
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activities. You might even point to one or two co-workers
as possible leakers if you’re confident they will be cleared.
You’ll also need to behave normally with your coworkers. This means that when asked about the leak,
you’ll need to feign surprise, cynicism, anger or whatever
emotion would be most typical of you if you weren’t the
leaker. Indeed, it can be useful to imagine that actually
someone else was the leaker (maybe there were two
independent leaks) and respond accordingly. If you’re
normally an outgoing, gossipy sort of person, then you’ll
initiate conversations speculating about who the leaker
could be and what might happen. You could even joke that
some people might think you are the leaker and say,
facetiously, “I wish I’d done it. Damn whoever did this
before me.” Basically, you need to pretend to be yourself,
but in a parallel world in which you’re not the leaker.
If you’re a trusted employee, known for your conscientiousness and integrity, it’s possible that you will be put
in charge of an investigation to find the leaker. This will
require of you another level of acting, as you go through
the motions of trying to find the leaker. You need to make
the investigation seem thorough but come up short.
If your leak is about something important, something
that can thwart major corruption or save lives, the ethics of
leaking are straightforward: you are lying for a good
cause. Instead of speaking up immediately and thereby
allowing the perpetrators to marginalise you and cover up
their actions, by leaking you are most likely being far
more effective.
However, there is one scenario that can cause anguish. If your bosses are ruthless, they may decide to
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finger some worker as the leaker and take reprisals,
perhaps firing them. They picked some innocent person to
make the real leaker — you! — feel guilty. You might try
to leak information to show that your bosses penalised the
wrong person, but they don’t care. There’s no easy answer
to this dilemma. It’s possible that you’ll want to resign as
soon as you’ve finished gathering as much information as
possible.
An action group and a leaker make for a powerful
combination. The action group — on the environment,
financial probity, human rights, or some other cause —
has the freedom to speak out, organise protests and take
actions that workers could not contemplate, because they
would immediately lose their jobs. However, the activists
need to know what’s happening inside the organisation:
what plans are being made, what impact protests have had,
and what strategies would be most effective. A leaker or
confidential informant can provide the inside perspective
that can help the action group be far more effective. The
action-group-leaker combination is potent — and it requires ongoing secrecy and deception.
Planning an action
Your group is planning a protest. Should you inform the
police about your plans? Should you invite the police to
attend your planning meeting? Answers depend on several
factors.
One factor is how safe it is to protest. If police, politicians and most members of the public think public protest
is acceptable and routine, even laudable, then it may be a
good idea to invite the police to attend your meeting and
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send them the minutes. This will build trust with the police
— at least if your protest does not involve violence — and
can allow you to focus on what you are protesting about,
for example militarism, environmental damage or racism.
If the police know what’s going to happen, they are much
less likely to over-react. In fact, they may become your
protectors if there are counter-protesters who want to
attack you.
In some circumstances public protest is very risky,
with a high likelihood of arrests and beatings. If the police
know what you’re planning, they might arrest your leaders
in advance, blockade the location of your protest, or
prepare for mass arrests. In such a circumstance, being
open about your plans would be disastrous, so some
degree of secrecy and deception is warranted.
Perhaps you are organising a “flash mob”: members
of your group seem to be going their separate ways and
happen to converge on a busy street in front of a bank and
then take coordinated action — singing a song or displaying some placards, for example — and 30 seconds later
melting into the crowd again. If police know about the
flash protest in advance, they may be able to thwart it.
Secrecy is essential, and so perhaps is spontaneity, with
the location chosen at the last moment and coordinated by
social media.
In a highly repressive situation, protest can be open if
protesters are relatively safe. In Brazil in the 1960s, Chile
in the 1970s, Argentina in 2001, Turkey in 2013 and
elsewhere, people have banged pots and pans as a form of
protest, called cacerolazo. In some of these actions, people
remain in their apartments and commence banging at a
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designated time, thereby reducing their vulnerability to
police reprisals.
In this type of action, participants are open in what
they are doing. However, in some cases secrecy is needed
to organise the action, namely to decide on what it would
involve and how to communicate with the people. So it
was wise for planners and communicators to maintain a
low-profile role.
Sometimes activists believe they are under surveillance, for example with political police listening to their
phone calls. To test this belief, a highly deceptive technique can be used. The activists talk to each other by
phone about a protest they are planning for a particular
place and time. But instead of protesting, at the nominated
time they watch the location from a distance. If they see
police preparing as they usually do at demonstrations, this
is a good indication that someone has been listening in on
the activists’ phone conversations. However, if no police
are present, the implications aren’t clear. It might mean
the activists’ phones aren’t being tapped. Alternatively,
the police might be tapping the activists’ phones but
suspect the activists might be tricking them, so they are
also watching the location from a distance. Another possibility is that the police may not want to bother dealing
with run-of-the-mill protests, and instead save their
information for a more important action. Or perhaps the
police have an informant in the group who tells them what
the group is doing.
Another key factor is how many people can and will
join an action. The greater the participation, the safer it is
to join and so the lower the level of secrecy needed. If
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groups believe in openness whenever possible, to reduce
the level of unaccountable power associated with secrecy,
then organising actions that enable wide participation may
often be a preferable option.
These examples illustrate that in planning an action,
the suitable level of secrecy depends a lot on a range of
factors, especially the likely response of authorities to
protest. Usually the more repressive the circumstances, the
more secrecy is warranted.
Communicating confidentially
Activists, like other people, often want to ensure confidentiality when communicating with each other and with
trusted outsiders. This is especially true when there is the
possibility that governments or private investigators are
using surveillance techniques to monitor conversations.
Surveillance capacities are becoming ever more formidable. It is possible, for example, to remotely install
software on electronic devices to record every keystroke,
or to use lasers to record the vibrations of window panes
and thereby detect what people are saying inside a room.
There are now mechanical insects that can be piloted into
a room and used to obtain real-time video feeds to those
running this “bug.”
Monitoring can also occur via collection of metadata,
for example electronic records of when and where a phone
is used to make a call or when a credit card transaction is
made. By combining metadata, an individual’s location
and interactions can be pinned down with remarkable
precision. Using a mobile device can provide signals about
a person’s location; driving a car may enable collection of
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information about location via electronic recognition of
licence numbers; surveillance cameras can provide images
to place individuals at particular times and places; use of
social media can provide data for analysing a person’s
profile and predilections.
Pervasive electronic monitoring is more common, yet
there is relatively little opposition to it, in part because
most people are entranced by the benefits of connectedness: they voluntarily supply information about themselves on social media and revel in the ease of electronic
commerce. Most people will never come under intensive
surveillance: information about them is collected but never
used for any adverse purpose. However, some individuals
and groups have more to worry about.
Common targets for intensive surveillance include
political leaders (by foreign governments), terrorism suspects, organised crime figures, leaders of trade unions and
extreme political parties, investigative journalists — and
activists. Organising a protest on a sensitive topic, whether
freedom of speech, animal rights, genetic engineering or
economic inequality, can make a group a candidate for
scrutiny. It is in this context that activists may want to
safeguard their communications, for example when discussing strategy or planning actions.
One tried-and-true method is to talk face-to-face,
away from all electronic devices and perhaps with some
background noise to make remote monitoring difficult.
When sending sensitive messages, encryption can be used
to deter reading of the contents: the message may be
intercepted but cannot be immediately read. Other options
include using anonymous remailers (to allow sending
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emails so recipients cannot see who sent them), anonymous web browsers (such as Tor), pseudonyms and fake
identities (for example on social media). Other possibilities are to use someone else’s phone, to set up multiple
identities online, and to use false names. These all involve
some level of secrecy and/or deception.
There is a longstanding competition between encryption system developers and designers and those who try to
decipher encrypted messages. This is a story in itself, with
its own elements of secrecy and deception. There are
many technical details, and new options are being developed all the time.
In places where expressing criticism of the government is seen as subversive and where penalties are severe,
maintaining anonymity seems warranted both ethically
and practically. In 2010 in Egypt, Wael Ghonim set up a
Facebook page titled “We are all Khalid Said,” after the
name of a young man who was beaten to death by police.
The page quickly became highly popular and was a
magnet for opposition to the regime. Ghonim went to
great lengths to maintain his anonymity. If his identity had
been known to the Egyptian authorities, his life would
have been in danger and the effectiveness of the Facebook
page greatly reduced.3
In other circumstances, anonymity is less beneficial.
If a dissident is arrested, one of the greatest sources of
protection is being known to outsiders, both inside a
country and internationally.
3 Wael Ghonim, Revolution 2.0 (London: Fourth Estate, 2012).
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Infiltrating the opposition
Being a spy is a way of gaining information. It means
pretending you are part of a group — a foreign country, a
corporate competitor or an opposition party — when actually you are serving a different one.
Spying has a long tradition in foreign affairs. Consider for example the US and Chinese governments: each
one would like to gather secret information about the
other, and one way is to have agents who infiltrate various
organisations in the other country. A US spy might seek to
join a government department in China, and likewise a
Chinese spy might seek to join a US research agency — or
they might already work in these organisations and be
recruited to spy.
These days, electronic surveillance has replaced
much spying, and there is not as much reliance on individual agents to gather information. If you can intercept
phone conversations, it’s less important to actually be
there. Nevertheless, individual spying still plays a role.
Spying requires an exceptional level of deception: the
spy must convince everyone in the target group of being
genuine. It essentially means lying almost all the time.
As described in chapter 3, activist groups have been
targets of spying, the most well known case involving the
anarchist group London Greenpeace, which was infiltrated
by agents paid by McDonald’s, which then sued five
members of the group for defamation. Helen Steel, who
along with Dave Morris defended the case, was later the
victim of an even more damaging type of deception. She
had a relationship, lasting many years, with a man who
called himself John Barker. Then, suddenly, he disap-
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peared. It turned out that his actual name was John Dines,
and he was an undercover officer working for the London
Metropolitan Police. He was a married man tasked with
gaining information about Steel’s activities by establishing
and maintaining the closest type of personal relationship.
Steel was just one of a number of activists who
became victims of this sort of deception. And it was a
particularly damaging experience, undermining Steel’s
trust in others.
Now think of this from the other side, from the point
of view of the infiltrators. They are paid to collect information about groups that are criminal or dangerous, at
least according to the infiltrators’ employers. To do this,
they pretend to be activists, pretend to be concerned about
the issues and pretend to be friends with genuine activists.
In some of this, no pretending is required: the infiltrators
might feel a real sense of connection with activists, and
even be sympathetic to their cause. But they also have
another loyalty, to their employer, so they betray the
activists through turning over confidential information. If
they form intimate relationships with activists, even
having children with them, the deception and betrayal are
even more serious.
London Greenpeace was infiltrated by agents paid by
McDonald’s. Think now of infiltration in the opposite
direction: activists infiltrating mainstream organisations,
for example armies, corporations or government departments. There are differences between these two scenarios,
of course. Activists would become infiltrators out of
commitment to a cause, not because they are paid. Mainstream organisations have enormous resources to pay
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infiltrators, whereas few activist organisations have sufficient funds to pay generous salaries even to their own
staff.
Imagine, then, a committed peace activist who decides to get a job with an arms manufacturing firm, or a
committed environmental activist who decides to get a job
with an oil company. Their plan would be to rise within
the organisation, obtain inside information and feed it to
their campaigning allies on the outside. This would require
an exceptional level of long-term deception: as well as
needing to put on a mask during working hours, it might
also involve socialising after hours. Any deviation from a
highly conformist corporate culture would by risky, jeopardising the possibility of advancement or even risking
exposure. The more the infiltrator adapts to the organisational culture, the more revealing are the insights.
There is always a risk of “going native”: inhabiting a
role thoroughly and for a long period may lead to a change
in beliefs. Most corporate workers are decent people who
are quite sincere in their commitments, and the activist
infiltrator might come to sympathise with them and lose
incentive to expose what is going on. Another problem is
that the information gained would not be very useful to
outsiders. Unless there is major corruption, and the infiltrator has access to revealing information, there is not
much to report, except for corporate culture itself. This is
indeed a mystery to outsiders, but is not top secret. It’s
possible for activist groups to interview corporate insiders
or to get to know them through social networks.
The question then arises: is infiltration by activists
worthwhile in purely pragmatic terms? Anyone willing to

126

The deceptive activist

spend months or years for a cause might achieve more by
other means, such as becoming a campaigner or organiser.
It might be easier to gain inside information by cultivating
contacts inside organisations than trying to infiltrate them.
Add to this the risk of infiltrators becoming sympathetic to
the people they engage with, and it might be that infiltration is not a very effective tactic.
Indeed, it can be asked whether government and
corporate infiltration into activist groups is all that effective. It can be disruptive and harmful, but does it provide
information that can’t be gained otherwise? One thing is
sure, infiltration can be highly damaging to the people
involved. In this case, deception is disastrous to relationships, and so should be contemplated only in extreme
circumstances.
Wearing masks
At some demonstrations, protesters wear masks. Usually
the reason is to prevent reprisals from authorities. Police
may identify and arrest leaders; they may photograph
crowds, attempt to identify participants and put their
names on lists, subject them to additional surveillance, or
arrest them. In some circumstances, being identified as a
protester means the possibility of imprisonment, interrogation and torture.
Another reason for wearing masks is to encourage
more people to participate. When the risk of reprisals is
lower, and lots of people are involved, it feels safer to join
the crowd.
Given these advantages, it might be asked, why don’t
protesters wear masks all the time? One reason is that by
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being open, protesters can more readily trust each other:
they feel more confident when they are among their
friends. It is easier to communicate when observing facial
expressions.
When protesters wear masks, it is easier for agents of
the police or security forces to infiltrate the demonstration
and do things to discredit the protest, for example by
shouting verbal abuse or throwing stones at shop windows
or at police, thereby helping justify police action against
the protesters.4 There is also evidence that wearing a mask
can have a disinhibition effect: it may make it easier to
steal and be aggressive towards others. Actions seen as
antisocial can discredit the protest.5
Wearing a mask at a demonstration is a fairly minor
form of deception. It hides the identity of protesters from
police, but not necessarily from other protesters, especially
4 Members of “black blocs,” who wear black clothing and usually
cover their faces, often engage in aggressive actions against
police and property. Their actions can be used by police to justify
repression against all protesters, including the bulk of protesters
who are not violent. For a sophisticated analysis of black blocs,
see Francis Dupuis-Déri, Who’s Afraid of the Black Blocs?
Anarchy in Action around the World (Toronto: Between the
Lines, 2013).
5 Edward Diener, Scott C. Fraser, Arthur L. Beaman and Roger
T. Kelem, “Effects of deindividuation variables on stealing
among Halloween trick-or-treaters,” Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, Vol. 33, No. 2, 1976, pp. 178–183; Robert I.
Watson, Jr., “Investigation into deindividuation using a crosscultural survey technique,” Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, Vol. 25, No. 3, 1973, pp. 342–345.
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when sticking with a group of friends who recognise each
other’s voices. Even so, agents provocateurs have an
easier time when protesters wear masks.
So there are quite a few factors to take into account
when deciding whether wearing masks is a good idea,
including the level of repression and the risk of reprisals,
the number of people participating and the risk of infiltration by police agents.
Setting up a radical flank
In the US environmental movement, mainstream organisations like the Sierra Club6 primarily use methods such as
lobbying and providing information: they work within the
system. Then there is Earth First! It uses sabotage to
oppose assaults on nature, for example pulling up survey
stakes and putting sand in the petrol tanks of vehicles.
(Earth First! activists take great care to avoid endangering
humans.) From the point of view of the mainstream
organisations, Earth First! is a “radical flank.” A radical
flank pursues more extreme objectives or uses more forceful methods.7
6 In recent years, the Sierra Club has taken stronger
environmental stands and done more to encourage grassroots
action.
7 The classic reference is Herbert H. Haines, “Black
radicalization and the funding of civil rights: 1957–1970,” Social
Problems, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1984, pp. 31–43. For a recent analysis,
see Eric Chenoweth and Kurt Schock, “Do contemporaneous
armed challenges affect the outcomes of mass nonviolent
campaigns?” Mobilization, Vol. 20, No. 4, 2015, pp. 427–451.
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In some struggles against repressive regimes, methods of nonviolent action such as rallies, strikes and boycotts become the dominant approach. Armed resistance in
such circumstances represents a radical flank.
Radical flanks can be beneficial or harmful to the
cause. Sometimes the radical flank is seen as threatening
to opponents, who as a result may make concessions to
mainstream groups. This is called a positive radical flank
effect. On the other hand, sometimes a radical flank is
seen as so extreme or dangerous that it discredits the
movement, turning popular opinion away. This is a
negative radical flank effect. Sometimes there are combinations of positive and negative effects.
Imagine you’re in a human rights activist group
concerned about imprisonment of people without trial, socalled preventive detention. You decide to try to take
advantage of the positive radical flank effect. You think
the mainstream groups are fairly conventional: they make
submissions to governments, push for law reform and
issue press releases. Yet these efforts don’t seem to you to
have much effect: your government is still imprisoning
people without trial. So your group decides to pretend to
be extreme, in an attempt to make the mainstream human
rights groups seem more acceptable. You say you’re going
to arrest a couple of leading politicians and hold them in
preventive detention until the laws are changed and political prisoners are released.
You might have some reservations. Your group’s
announcement might end up being counterproductive: it
might be a negative radical flank effect. It might lead to
intense surveillance of your group and all human rights
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groups. It might lead to an expansion of preventive detention. For the sake of this example, set aside your reservations and assume the effect is positive: preventive
detention is shown up as outrageous.
Your group made the announcement, but actually
none of you ever intended to arrest politicians or hold
them hostage. It was all rhetoric designed to attract attention and serve the cause. It was an elaborate lie. Was it a
good idea? Can lying be worthwhile to produce a positive
radical flank effect?
Your group might lose all credibility if your lie is
exposed. Perhaps, after the laws are changed, you come
out and say it was all pretence. Or perhaps a government
agent informs on your discussions, or your phones are
tapped and your deception is exposed. Does it matter?
One disadvantage is that a major deception like this
can undermine the credibility of other human rights
groups. On the other hand, perhaps your group will be
seen as rogue operators, and people are more likely to turn
to the tried and true human rights groups. That’s the whole
point of being a radical flank in this example.
Now imagine a different scenario. Your group wants
to discredit your opponents by creating a negative radical
flank effect. Your plan is to set up a fake group that
supports your opponents and is so extreme that it hurts
them. You’re in a pro-choice group and you want to
discredit opponents of abortion, so you set up a fake group
that advocates maiming women who have abortions. Alternatively, you’re in a pro-life group and you want to
discredit pro-choice groups, so you set up a fake group
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that advocates assaulting pro-life protesters outside abortion clinics.
Setting up such fake groups is risky, because they
might not have a negative effect: they might actually give
support for your opponents. Another possibility is that the
fake groups might become real groups: the existence of a
fake group might attract people who think this sort of
extreme action is a good idea. The result might be maiming of women who have abortions or assaults on abortion
protesters, with serious harm to individuals and unpredictable wider consequences. It might even be that your fake
group triggers an escalation of retaliatory violence in the
struggle.
For the purposes here, the key issue is the role of
deception, and setting up a fake group is definitely
deceptive. The whole operation, if exposed, might backfire on your side, suggesting that everyone supporting
your cause is implicated. If the deception is exposed, your
attempt to create a negative radical flank effect for the
opponents might instead create a negative radical flank
effect for your own side. (This possibility suggests an
even more devious tactic: setting up a fake group that you
allow or intend to be exposed at some point so it will
discredit your opponents.)
In quite a few struggles, there are fake groups, most
commonly set up by industry. For example, corporations
have set up groups that pretend to be community groups
supporting environmental causes when actually they are
funded by corporations and take anti-environmental
stands. For example, according to Sourcewatch, the Center
for Consumer Freedom is a front for tobacco, meat, restau-
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rant and alcohol interests, and attacks environmentalists
and others it sees as threats.8 Fake groups like this are
commonly called front groups, and when they pretend to
be composed of sincere citizens the process is called
astroturfing, named after the synthetic grass substitute
used in indoor sporting arenas. Astroturfing is setting up
fake grassroots groups.
Front groups are most commonly used by corporations and governments and involve deception to serve the
interests of those with more economic and political power.
Activist groups seldom use front groups, most obviously
because they are the real grassroots and don’t need to
pretend to represent community interests. It is probably
unlikely that activists would want to set up a fake group.9
Nevertheless, the thought experiment concerning radical
flanks is useful for discussing whether deception is worthwhile, in moral or pragmatic terms.
Circulating disinformation
Activists often have to deal with false and misleading
information from governments, which can be designed to
hide crimes, to make bad policies look good or to discredit
opponents. This can be called disinformation, propaganda
or in some cases information warfare. The purpose of
informing and educating people is secondary; instead,
8 http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Center_for_Consumer_
Freedom
9 Umbrella organisations are sometimes set up to allow silenced
groups to have a voice, but such organisations are open about
their aims.
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information is used, sincerely or cynically, as a tool to
achieve goals. Disreputable techniques include making
false claims (lying), giving a misleading impression by
emphasising information that is not representative, tarnishing reputations by suggesting discrediting connections, and putting out fabricated documents that seem to
come from others.
Should activists ever use disinformation techniques?
They are definitely deceptive, and they are potentially
harmful to others. But perhaps there are compensating
benefits.10
Imagine that you’re in an anti-racist group and you
are concerned about the rise of Suyptum, a militant,
outspoken organisation that is overtly racist.11 In public
actions and comments, it sometimes uses veiled threats
that encourage violence against ethnic minorities, and
have inspired a greater level of hate speech and violence.
By changing the tone of public debate, Suyptum has encouraged mainstream politicians to pander to prejudice.
The group has been receiving favourable media coverage,
especially from some right-wing outlets that are giving it
attention and credibility out of all proportion to its size
10 Robert L. Helvey, On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking
about the Fundamentals (Boston, MA: Albert Einstein Institution,
2004), includes a chapter on psychological operations that begins
“Psychological operations (PSYOPS) is the centerpiece of a wellplanned strategic nonviolent struggle” (p. 77). Helvey advocates
use of propaganda to influence people’s attitudes and behaviours,
but only for worthwhile causes: he sees propaganda as a neutral
tool. He does not explicitly recommend deceptive practices.
11 Suyptum is fictitious.
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and its incoherent policies. You see the increasing popularity of Suyptum as a serious threat to the tolerance and
inclusiveness that you’ve been promoting for years.
You’ve received some reports about Suyptum that
suggest an unsavoury side to its activities. You are sorely
tempted to do whatever is possible to undermine its credibility and disrupt its activities. Your group brainstorms
some possible tactics.
You know that Suyptum’s beliefs seem to be an
amalgam of xenophobia, nationalism and welfare policies.
You decide that you could label Suyptum a cult that
promotes, indeed mandates, a strange set of beliefs. You
know this is an exaggeration and that Suyptum is no more
a cult than your own group, but applying the label will
help discredit it. Furthermore, in labelling Suyptum a cult,
you can spread rumours that anyone subscribing to
Suyptum beliefs will, later on, be targeted.
You have a bit of second-hand evidence that
Suyptum has been very sloppy with its finances, collecting
donations but not properly accounting for expenditures.
You decide to claim that Suyptum is corrupt and is fleecing the public.
A couple of Suyptum supporters are collectors of
Nazi artefacts, in the spirit of thumbing their noses at
political correctness. You decide to highlight the connection between Suyptum and the Nazis, suggesting that
Suyptum is anti-Semitic, anti-gay and potentially murderous, even though all the main figures in Suyptum are careful to avoid any association with Nazis or other fascists.
Suyptum is organising a three-day conference, a
showcase for its ideas and a venue for developing policies

Case studies

135

and plans. Several prominent individuals, not previously
involved with Suyptum, have agreed to speak at the conference. One of your members tells of a plan to write
letters to these speakers that seem to come from a
disgruntled Suyptum member, providing damaging
information about Suyptum that might discourage their
attendance.
All these techniques — attributing beliefs, applying a
misleading label, making allegations, highlighting negative associations and circulating damaging information —
are deceptive. Using them is risky, because your techniques could be exposed, your methods seen as underhanded and your group discredited as a result. So can you
get away with circulating disinformation? The larger and
more powerful your group and the weaker your opponent,
the more likely you can use disinformation techniques and
not be held to account. That is exactly why authorities use
them so often. Even so, it’s possible that your opponents
have skills to expose your methods, and there might be
some people not involved who like to expose false claims
and unfair techniques. If your methods are exposed, this
might be a recruiting tool for Suyptum.
The better the reputation of your group and your
cause, the more you have to lose by being associated with
devious methods. Because disinformation campaigning is
potentially disastrous if exposed, you may want to take
steps to avoid accidentally using this form of campaigning. When you think the worst of your opponent — they
are racists, after all — it is easy to assume that negative
information about them is correct. So you, or some of the
members of your group, are quick to attribute beliefs,
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apply derogatory labels and accept that damaging claims
about Suyptum are true. Then, it is a short step to circulating claims or using labels in newsletters, in public
statements and on social media.
All it takes for this process to occur is lack of checking. Someone tells one of your members about some
gossip about Suyptum, and it is taken as the truth. The
information might be true, but about a single member, or it
might be misleading. Strangely enough, then, if you want
to avoid circulating disinformation and be exposed for
doing so, you need to be extra careful in everything you
say about your opponents. This is because of the natural
tendency to believe that “we” are good and “they” are bad
and so to assume the worst about others. This is a type of
self-deception and requires constant attention to avoid.
If you are really serious about being fair to your
opponents, then ideally you can establish a connection
with one or more of them and check any information that
comes your way before using it. If no one in your group
knows anyone in Suyptum, another option is consulting
someone — perhaps a journalist or academic — who
studies the issue and the groups. Yet another option is to
assign someone in your group to be a devil’s advocate and
to take Suyptum’s side, or attempt to think from
Suyptum’s point of view, when examining claims about
Suyptum.
In summary, using disinformation techniques can be
very damaging to opponents. At the same time, using them
is risky because if you are exposed, your reputation may
be seriously damaged. Therefore it may be worthwhile to
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take extra care not to inadvertently use these sorts of
techniques.
Appearing conventional
Suppose you have some radical ideas. For example, you
think the military should be abolished, that everyone
should receive the same income, that all drugs should be
legalised or that seriously disabled babies should be
euthanised. Should you share your views with all your
friends and workmates?
In many circumstances, it might be better to hide or
moderate your views. You might have good reasons to
back them up — lots of evidence and carefully considered
arguments — but know that most people are not interested
in this. Rather, they will make a summary judgement
based purely on a gut reaction.12 For example, they might
think legalising drugs is foolish and dismiss your views
without serious consideration. Furthermore, they might
dismiss your views on other topics too, assuming that if
you have one crazy idea, then nothing you have to say is
worthy of consideration.
So, as a result, you decide to be careful about what
you say, only expressing your true views with others you
trust totally. And because many people love to gossip, and
might exaggerate stories in the retelling, you are very
careful indeed about sharing your views. In doing this,
you’re being deceptive. Indeed, you could be said to be
12 On what drives these reactions, see Jonathan Haidt, The
Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and
Religion (New York: Pantheon, 2012).
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lying by omission, namely not revealing the full truth
about your beliefs.
If a whole group of people behave like this, the result
can be an appearance of conformity. This happens in
corporations when subordinates say only what they think
the boss wants to hear. The actual diversity of viewpoints
is hidden, and workers may not even realise that others
share their views.
There’s another down side of being cautious about
expressing personal viewpoints. Over time, behaviour can
influence beliefs: if you never express your views, then
your views might change to reflect your behaviour, so
eventually you don’t have those radical ideas any more, or
at least not in such a well developed form.
When you defend a viewpoint, presenting evidence
and rebutting counter-arguments, you may end up believing it more strongly.13 By failing to defend your belief, the
belief itself may fade.
There’s a related issue concerning appearing conventional or mainstream. If you have radical ideas and
campaign for radical goals, should you dress and behave
correspondingly? For example, suppose you hold anarchist
views, believing governments should be abolished and
replaced by self-managing groups. Should you dress in the
stereotype of an anarchist, perhaps wearing punk clothes,
nose rings and tattoos? Should you behave according to

13 Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler, “When corrections fail: the
persistence of political misperceptions,” Political Behavior, Vol.
32, No. 2, 2010, pp. 303–330.
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the stereotype of an anarchist, being loud and insulting
authority figures?
An alternative is to dress and behave like others who
do not share your views. You can be the well-dressed and
well-spoken anarchist, looking like any other corporate
executive or doctor or whatever. Some people might think
this is deceptive, but only if there is some expectation to
dress and behave according to stereotypes. There is no
rule that people attending protests must dress like the
stereotype of a protester, whatever that stereotype might
be. It might be more effective to wear formal dress, or an
occupational uniform, and thus confound expectations.
Not conforming to stereotypes can be effective, but is
it deceptive? It might clash with people’s expectations, but
you aren’t setting out to deceive anyone and in fact you
may be offering a deeper truth: stereotypes of radicals are
misleading. There is no necessary connection between
beliefs, clothes and verbal styles.
There is an interesting interaction between behaviour
and beliefs. People will often judge protesters according to
their methods more than their beliefs. If protesters use
violence, then many observers will see them as extreme,
assuming their goal is to destroy society: they are extremists, indeed terrorists. It often doesn’t matter that their
goals are protecting the environment or stopping a war. By
the same sort of inference, others may judge you more
according to your dress and verbal style than by your
beliefs. If you are calm and polite, your beliefs may be
treated as more reasonable than if you are angry and
verbally aggressive. The implication is that how you
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express your views may be, in some circumstances, more
important than what your views actually are.14
Back to the original question: should you share your
radical views with others? You might decide to hide your
views so you can fit in better. However, there’s a related
question: how should you dress, speak and behave?
Should you conform to stereotypes or try to confound
them? Finally, if any of your choices involve deception —
hiding and thus implicitly misrepresenting your views —
can this deception be justified, and is it a good idea?
Other situations
There are many other situations in which activists might
be deceptive for a good cause. Here are some possibilities.15
• Helping asylum seekers, dissidents, deserters, persecuted individuals or targets of domestic violence to hide:
this might involve lying about their names, backgrounds
and locations.
• Investigating military and national security operations: this might involve lying about your name and
identity when making enquiries.
• Investigating human rights abuses: to gain access to
countries and locations within them, it may be useful to
use forged identity documents, wear disguises, create
14 This is called correspondence bias. See for example Nicholas
Epley, Mindwise: How We Understand what Others Think,
Believe, Feel and Want (London: Penguin, 2014), p. 142.
15 I thank Jørgen Johansen, Jason MacLeod and Dalilah ReubenShemia for suggesting several of these possibilities.
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cover stories (which can involve others lying to verify the
story), lie about relationships, and much else.
• Ploughshare actions: planning actions to damage
military equipment, for example hammering missile
nosecones, as a symbolic and material protest against
military operations, usually requires some degree of secrecy. Ploughshare activists usually offer themselves for
arrest after their actions, in the same location, so secrecy is
not used to avoid accountability, but rather to enable their
acts of civil disobedience.
• Being a labour organiser: in many workplaces, there
are risks in trying to recruit members for trade unions or
building support for an industrial action such as a strike or
work-in. Organisers and workplace union delegates who
are open in their activities could be fired or barred from
the workplace. Furthermore, employers may be better able
to counter future organising efforts.
• Humorous political stunts: some types of humour
used by activists can deceive some audience members, at
least part of the time.16 For example, in Copenhagen on 22
December 1974, activists dressed as Santas took books off
shop shelves and gave them to customers, saying they
were free, as a protest against the commercialisation of
Christmas. The Yes Men specialise in elaborate hoaxes
that serve as political statements, for example announcing
that the company Union Carbide took responsibility for
the victims of the chemical accident at its plant in Bhopal,
India, and made a huge payment in settlement.
16 Majken Jul Sørensen, Humour in Political Activism: Creative
Nonviolent Resistance (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
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• Size of a protest group: to maintain morale or
deceive opponents, lies might be told about the number of
people attending a rally or occupation. Jørgen Johansen
tells of a civil disobedience action in Mardøla, Norway, in
1969 to block construction of a dam. Activists established
a tent camp. Individuals brought and set up several tents
each, most of them empty, to mislead the police and media
about the number of protesters involved.
• Corruption in the movement: when members of a
group are suspected of stealing money or abusing other
members, a covert investigation might be undertaken.
• Detecting infiltrators: when there are suspicions
about infiltrators, one way of finding out is to give
misleading information to a few people and see what
happens. For example, if police seem to act on the basis of
the information, this might be due to infiltrators (though
electronic surveillance is another possibility).
Assessing the use of deception
Each of the situations described above involves activists
being deceptive in some way. You might have your own
views about whether deception is essential, justified,
irrelevant, risky, harmful or disastrous — or some other
assessment. Here I will illustrate some ways to evaluate
the use of deception according to different criteria. These
ways do not provide conclusive answers, but can be
helpful in thinking about deception from a variety of
perspectives.
First consider the view that lying is nearly always
bad: it should be avoided except in rare cases. This view
derives from Kant via his categorical imperative, which
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involves looking at the consequences of everyone doing
what you do, and if everyone is deceptive, there are big
problems. This view might also be derived from Gandhi,
for whom honesty was paramount.17
A contrasting view is the pragmatic approach. In this
view, lying is accepted as something that can be beneficial
or harmful. There is no universal judgement possible: each
circumstance needs to be assessed on its own merits. For
example, lying to a friend can be justified when in helps
them or maintains a valuable relationship. Table 6.1 gives
a summary judgement for each activity for Kantian and
pragmatic approaches.
Some of these assessments could be contested. For
example, a Gandhian might say that appearing conventional in dress and demeanour is okay if that’s the way you
really are, even though it deceives others about your
beliefs and intentions. A pragmatist might say that setting
up a fake radical flank will always be foolish. In general,
though, these two approaches to deception do not provide
a lot of guidance.
17 For a useful discussion of openness and secrecy in nonviolent
struggle, see Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action
(Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973), pp. 481–492. Sharp was the
pioneering researcher on the pragmatic approach to nonviolent
action, in contrast to Gandhi’s approach founded on morals.
However, Sharp reaches conclusions not all that different from
Gandhi’s, namely that openness is usually better than secrecy,
even when facing severe repression. See also Robert Burrowes,
The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense: A Gandhian Approach
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996), pp.
230–232.
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Table 6.1 Judgements about activities involving deception
from Kantian and pragmatic perspectives
Activity
Keeping a secret
Leaking
Planning an action
Communicating
confidentially
Infiltrating the
opposition
Wearing masks
Setting up a radical
flank
Circulating
disinformation
Appearing
conventional

Kantian
approach
No
No
No
No

Pragmatic
approach
It depends
It depends
It depends
It depends

No

It depends

No
No

It depends
It depends

No

It depends

No

It depends

Another approach is to assess situations according to the
features of effective nonviolent action, discussed earlier in
chapter 5.18 This doesn’t immediately tell you whether
deception is a good idea, but it does provide some insight
that can be used in discussions, taken from a pragmatic
perspective, to get beyond “It depends.”
First is participation. In general, the more people who
can participate in a form of social action, the better. There
18 Brian Martin, Nonviolence Unbound (Sparsnäs, Sweden: Irene
Publishing, 2015).

Case studies

145

are several reasons why participation is valuable. Importantly, greater participation means a greater likelihood
of success in a campaign: rallies, if large enough, sometimes can help topple a dictator. When many different
sorts of people — men and women, young and old, rich
and poor, different occupations and so forth — can join in,
the movement can be broader, with a greater opportunity
for cross-fertilisation of ideas. Basically, the movement
will be stronger when lots of people from different walks
of life can join in common actions.
How does this apply to deception? The same sorts of
considerations apply. If only a few people, perhaps with
special skills, can participate in a form of deception, this
restricts its value: there is a possibility of abuse of power
and of vanguardism.
Table 6.2 Likely levels of participation in activities
involving deception
Activity
Keeping a secret
Leaking
Planning an action
Communicating
confidentially
Infiltrating the
opposition
Wearing masks

Participation
Dependent on the secret
A few leakers, many
recipients
Those involved in
planning
Those involved in
communicating
Infiltrators and maybe a
few others
Everyone in an action who
wants to
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Setting up a radical
flank
Circulating
disinformation
Appearing
conventional

Those involved in the
operation and a few others
Potentially nearly
everyone, including
unwitting participants
Potentially nearly
everyone

Some activities, like setting up a radical flank, involve just
a few people whereas for others, like circulating disinformation, lots of people can join in. When participation is
restricted, it’s more likely the deception can be used by a
small group to serve its own interests. This assumes,
though, that the deception is something worth doing.
It is worth looking at methods of deception in terms
of whether they are a desirable goal for a future society.
For activism, the implication is that the means of achieving a goal should reflect or embody the goal itself. For
example, if you want peace, then use peaceful methods to
pursue it. This is sometimes called prefiguration: methods
should embody, or prefigure, the goal.
In relation to deception, this raises quite a few
questions, because people may differ about the desirable
level and types of deception in a future society.19 Many
19 A desirable future society might be less than perfect. For
example, there might be serious conflicts along with mechanisms
for resolving them without violence. There might continue to be
activities that some people believe are damaging and should be
challenged or curtailed, so leaking and wearing masks might still
be needed.
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might agree that ill-intentioned, harmful deception should
be minimised, and likewise institutional deception, and
say that benign interpersonal deception is acceptable.
Then there is the question of whether people should
become more aware of the prevalence of deception. These
are difficult questions. In Table 6.3, one possible set of
answers is given. Others will differ in their assessments.
The point here is that these issues are worth discussing.
Prefiguration is a criterion, but it is not definitive.
Table 6.3 One set of answers concerning whether an
activity prefigures a desirable future society
Activity
Keeping a secret
Leaking
Planning an action
Communicating
confidentially
Infiltrating the
opposition
Wearing masks
Setting up a radical
flank
Circulating
disinformation
Appearing
conventional

Prefiguration
Possibly, dependent on the
secret
Yes, if leaking remains
necessary
Dependent on decisions by
those involved
Dependent on decisions by
those involved
Not desirable
Possibly if necessary
Not desirable
Not desirable
Yes, if desired
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Another feature of effective nonviolent action is that harm
to opponents and third parties is limited. Nonviolent
action, by definition, means no physical violence is used
against opponents. However, methods such as strikes and
boycotts can cause economic harm, and methods such as
ostracism can cause psychological distress. The principle
of limited harm is that actions should be designed to
minimise harm to others, compatible with the goals of the
action. For example, if an employer is exploiting workers
or exposing the community to dangerous chemicals, a
strike or boycott might cause economic or reputational
harm to the employer, but this can be judged necessary to
challenge the greater harm caused by the employer. On the
other hand, there is no need to extend a boycott if the
employer makes appropriate changes.
Table 6.4 gives one possible assessment of the harm
caused by methods involving deception.
Table 6.4 Possible harm caused by using methods
involving deception
Activity
Keeping a secret

Leaking
Planning an action

Possible harm
Little or none for benign
lies; dependent on the
secret and individuals
involved
Exposure of confidential
information; breakdown of
trust
Little or none
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confidentially
Infiltrating the
opposition
Wearing masks
Setting up a radical
flank

Circulating
disinformation
Appearing
conventional
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Little or none
Breakdown of trust
None, unless the masks
are seen as threatening
Severe damage to
campaigns if the radical
flank causes harm to
individuals or is
counterproductive
Damage to campaigns
None

You might want to contest some of these assessments. For
example, secrecy in planning an action might break down
trust built up previously through liaison with police. This
suggests that the assessments are dependent on the
context. Still, there are considerable differences in the
possible harms involved. Leaking is a much more delicate
operation because of potential harms compared to wearing
masks at a rally.
Another feature worth considering is fairness: will
the deception seem fair to people who know about it? Of
course, if no one knows about a lie except the liar, then no
one will think it’s wrong. But some lies are exposed,
sooner or later, and that’s when the fairness criterion
becomes significant. If lots of people think, “That’s
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wrong” or “That’s horrible” and turn against the people
involved in the deception, this is a heavy price to pay. In
the worst case, the consequences of deception are far
worse than any potential benefits.
Table 6.5 lists possible assessments of the impact of a
form of deception being exposed to others, including
opponents and wider audiences.
Table 6.5 Impacts of activities involving deception,
in relation to judgements about fairness
Activity
Keeping a secret
Leaking
Planning an action
Communicating
confidentially
Infiltrating the
opposition
Wearing masks
Setting up a radical
flank
Circulating
disinformation
Appearing
conventional

Fairness-related impact
Not significant except to
those involved
Depends on the scenario
Not significant: normal
practice
Not significant: normal
practice
Antagonism, especially
from opponents
Not significant
Disastrous bad publicity
Possible bad publicity
Not significant

For several of the situations, there are few adverse consequences for exposure of deception. When activists keep
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secrets from each other, this usually is of no interest to
anyone else. There can be serious impacts on trust
between individuals, but others, if told about the keeping
of secrets, will probably say “So what?” Furthermore, in
some cases keeping secrets serves the goals of the group.
In this situation, then, the criterion of fairness provides
little leverage for a general assessment of deception.
Leaking is a complicated case. Suppose there is a
leaker in a government agency providing information to
an activist group that enables more effective campaigning.
No one knows about the leaking except the leaker and the
recipients of the leaks. If the leaking becomes known to
managers, they may be upset and take various measures,
for example instituting greater security measures, tracking
down the identity of the leaker, or playing a double game
with the activist group by circulating false information in
the expectation that it will be leaked. In all these eventualities, the leaking operation is potentially jeopardised, but
there are unlikely to be any public consequences.
Another possibility is that the group publicises the
leaked information, for example a secret plan for a trade
agreement or an internal memo about the dangers of a
pharmaceutical drug. In this case, the existence of a leaker
becomes public knowledge. The anonymous leaker might
be condemned by some and lauded by others, largely
depending on their viewpoint concerning the information
being leaked.
If the leaker is exposed, what are the consequences?
Will there be a backlash against your group, or will the
leaker be seen as a courageous, civic-minded whistleblower? A lot depends on who the leaker is and how the
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leaker behaves. A leaker who comes across as principled
and selfless will help your cause; one who has a shady
past, seems devious or who can easily be painted as
corrupt may hurt your cause. There are lots of complications. It is worth remembering that most leakers are never
exposed.
If you’re planning an action or a campaign and deception
is involved, it can be worthwhile considering the implications. The criteria here — participation, prefiguration,
possible harm and fairness — may be useful for helping to
think about what is involved. However, in some circumstances these criteria may be irrelevant and other factors
may be more important. The key is not the criteria but
being aware of the role of deception and discussing the
implications.
Conclusion
Is it a good idea to lie or otherwise deceive people? Most
people make choices concerning deception based on gut
reactions, often doing what others do or seem to do. In an
activist group, though, this can be risky because the
consequences can be harmful to the group and to the
cause. Depending on the circumstances, there are risks in
being too open and in being too secretive and devious.
To help minimise the risks, it is worth being aware of
options and possible outcomes, and a good way to increase awareness is to discuss case studies. Discussions
can be with one or two trusted friends or an entire group.
There are no automatic answers. The point is to put
deception and its consequences on the agenda.
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Saying that lying is always wrong is unlikely to be
helpful. Nor is it useful just to say, “It depends on the
circumstances,” because this provides little guidance. One
way to evaluate situations is by using criteria such as
harm, fairness, participation and prefiguration. These
criteria do not on their own offer a sure guide to making
good decisions. Their value is in encouraging thinking
about deception from different angles, thereby fostering a
richer and better informed discussion.
Finally, there is the question of what words to use.
“Lying” and “deception” have negative connotations, and
most people do not like to think of themselves as lying or
as deceiving others. Simply applying the label may be
enough to reject an option, which would be unfortunate.
One way forward is to change people’s attitudes towards
deception and to see it in a more neutral way, as either
beneficial or harmful. Another possibility is to use different words. In some cases, it’s possible to refer to secrecy
or, even better, to confidentiality. Wearing masks can be
portrayed as protecting against reprisals. Infiltrating the
opposition can be said to be collecting information about
corrupt and damaging activities.
The cases here are illustrations, intended to raise
issues rather than settle them. It is worthwhile thinking up
your own scenarios, analysing some actual cases and
discussing options. Much of the benefit comes not from
finding definitive answers but from making explicit what
is involved, and becoming attuned to options that can be
considered when sensitive issues arise.

7
Lessons
Lying has a bad reputation, and most people don’t like to
think of themselves as liars. One solution is to use a
restrictive definition of lying, so it only applies when
telling a blatant falsehood — and even then, most instances of lying are ignored as trivial or justified as
necessary. When someone asks “How are you?” and you
say “Fine” even though you’re feeling miserable, it’s
technically a lie but perhaps better classified as a convention. When you say you can’t come to the party because of
another engagement, when actually you can’t stand the
people, you’re just being polite.
Setting aside definitions, most people deceive others
in all sorts of ways, in the way they dress, in how they
behave, in what they say and in what they don’t say.
Rather than ignoring deception or condemning it while
engaging in it, another path is to recognise that it is
common and sometimes beneficial. Calling something
deception should not be the end of the story but rather the
beginning of an investigation.
Activists are people who want to change the world
for the better, and who do something beyond following the
rules or looking after their own interests. Activists include
public protesters as well as those who work within the
system while seeking to change it. Activists are usually
public-spirited, making sacrifices to address injustice. This
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makes activists sound wonderful, but activism can be
turned to harmful purposes. However, that is another
story.
Public-spirited activism may seem at odds with
deception. If someone is serving the public good, then
surely they should be honest. But if deception is an everyday practice, and sometimes beneficial, then there should
not necessarily be a clash between activism and deception.
It can be hard to accept that deception can sometimes
be valuable, especially when opponents might attack by
saying “You’re lying!” More deeply, the negative connotations of the words “lying” and “deception” are hard to
overcome, making it difficult to have a sensible discussion
of deception. Ironically, being honest about deception can
be challenging.
The first step is to recognise that deception is commonplace. Of course it is easy to point out that others —
especially authorities — are lying, as well as doing other
harmful things. This is definitely worthwhile. When politicians, business executives, and mass media blatantly lie
or engage in major cover-ups, exposing their deceptions
and presenting the truth is crucial. It can be useful for
activists to overcome their truth bias — the tendency of
most people to initially believe that others are telling the
truth — and to subject the actions and statements of those
in power to extra scrutiny.
It is more challenging to accept that everyone routinely engages in various forms of deception. We lie! But
it’s not all bad: some forms of deception are beneficial.
However, it would be self-serving to assume that their
deceptions are harmful but our deceptions are justified.
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Instead, the task should be to work out when deception is
necessary or valuable and to avoid harmful lying.
With these preliminaries — which may not be possible to accomplish — the stage is set for open and honest
discussions of the need for deception, and how to go about
it. Should we wear masks? Should we encrypt our messages? Should we announce our plans? Should we encourage leaks? Should we infiltrate the opposition? Should we
spread rumours?
Getting down to specifics can be helpful, because it
avoids the misleading dichotomy between lying and
telling the truth. It can be more productive to look at
actions and campaigns in terms of criteria such as participation and fairness. Questions of deception need to be
placed in context, as one consideration among others.
Activists have much to gain by becoming better at
detecting deception by others, especially by opponents.
Part of this is to practise trying to detect lies through
behavioural cues, something that can be improved through
practice. However, many people think they are good at
detecting lies when actually they can do no better than
chance, so it’s probably better to acquire a realistic sense
of one’s own abilities, and usually this means admitting
that you can’t tell when someone is lying just by watching
them. Far more effective is collecting evidence — documents, recordings, records of investigations — that can be
used to make a case about cover-ups and lies.
Perhaps the most useful thing to learn about is the
role of self-deception in human affairs. It is tempting to
think or claim that someone else — a politician or another
activist — is consciously trying to mislead you. However,
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often they have deceived themselves: they believe what
they are saying, which means they are not lying. Many
people start out lying and eventually start to believe their
own lies. They reconstruct their memories. Self-deception
has a close connection with lying, one often not fully
appreciated.
Everyone is subject to self-deception. Seeing that
others are deceiving themselves is one thing; it is more
challenging to see it in ourselves. To accomplish goals,
some self-deception can be functional: when the task is
enormous, some unrealistic optimism can help to get
started and continue efforts. Self-deception can also be
harmful, especially when it hinders developing a realistic
assessment of circumstances and personal behaviour. To
overcome the traps of self-deception, it is worthwhile
cultivating friends who will tell you what they really
think. If you react negatively against those who try to alert
you to unwelcome truths, you are missing out on valuable
feedback. The same applies to groups. There is a delicate
balance between maintaining illusions that build cohesion
at the expense of effectiveness and being open to contrary
views that can be integrated into a group’s way of understanding and acting in the world.
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“When telling a lie, remember to look
straight ahead and avoid blinking.”
Graphic adapted from
http://www.wikihow.com/Give-a-Speech-Without-Getting-Nervous

	
  

